Flip It and Reverse It: Examining Reverse Gender Discrimination Claims Brought Under Title IX by McMullan, Courtney Joy
Washington and Lee Law Review 
Volume 76 Issue 4 Article 9 
Fall 1-6-2020 
Flip It and Reverse It: Examining Reverse Gender Discrimination 
Claims Brought Under Title IX 
Courtney Joy McMullan 
Washington and Lee University School of Law, mcmullan.c@law.wlu.edu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/wlulr 
 Part of the Civil Rights and Discrimination Commons, Education Law Commons, Law and Gender 
Commons, and the Legislation Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Courtney Joy McMullan, Flip It and Reverse It: Examining Reverse Gender Discrimination Claims 
Brought Under Title IX, 76 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 1825 (2019), 
https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/wlulr/vol76/iss4/9 
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Washington and Lee Law Review at Washington & Lee 
University School of Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington and Lee Law 
Review by an authorized editor of Washington & Lee University School of Law Scholarly Commons. For more 
information, please contact christensena@wlu.edu. 
 
1825 
Flip It and Reverse It: Examining 
Reverse Gender Discrimination Claims 
Brought Under Title IX 
Courtney Joy McMullan* 
Table of Contents 
 I. Introduction ................................................................... 1826 
 II. Overview of Campus Sexual Assault ............................ 1832 
  A. Campus Sexual Assault ........................................... 1832 
  B. Title IX and Federal Guidance ................................ 1834 
  C. University Disciplinary Processes ........................... 1838 
  D. Title IX and Due Process ......................................... 1841 
 III. Stating a Reverse Title IX Claim .................................. 1842 
  A. Causes of Action ...................................................... 1844 
  B. Pleading Standards and Motions to Dismiss .......... 1849 
   1. Yusuf Baseline Standard ................................... 1851 
   2. Yusuf Applied at Motions to Dismiss ................ 1852 
 IV. Reverse Title IX and Summary Judgment .................... 1854 
  A. Summary Judgment Burdens                                                                                 
and Burden Shifting ................................................ 1854 
  B. Cases Reaching Summary Judgment ..................... 1857 
   1. First Circuit ....................................................... 1857 
   2. Sixth Circuit ....................................................... 1861 
   3. Title IX and McDonnell Douglas ....................... 1863 
 V. Argument ....................................................................... 1867 
  A. Limiting Courts’ Consideration of Pressure on 
    Universities .............................................................. 1868 
 
 * J.D. Candidate, May 2020, Washington and Lee University School of 
Law. I would like to thank Professor Joan M. Shaughnessy for her advice and 
support throughout the writing process. Thank you to the members of the 
Washington and Lee Law Review Editorial Board for their hard work assisting in 
the editing of this Note. Finally, a special thanks to my wonderful family for their 
constant encouragement and support throughout my academic career. 
1826 76 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1825 (2019) 
  B. Policies and Purposes of Title IX ............................. 1869 
  C. Maintaining a High Discriminatory                               
Intent Burden .......................................................... 1871 
 VI. Conclusion ...................................................................... 1873 
I. Introduction 
John Doe was beginning his senior year when his University 
received three anonymous complaints filed against him by Janes 
1, 2, and 3.1 Jane 1 described the night John offered to walk her 
home from the bar. She was heavily intoxicated from a party, but 
John followed her into her dorm room and proceeded to digitally 
penetrate her. Jane 2 told the University of an evening where John 
was touching, kissing, and trying to force himself on her despite 
her extreme intoxication and visible discomfort. Jane 3 recounted 
a night that John followed her into a bathroom and began touching 
her and exposing himself to her until she ran away.  
The University conducted an investigation into the complaints 
and held three hearings. John claimed little memory of the 
evenings, and the hearing panel found his testimony unpersuasive. 
The University ultimately found John responsible for the sexual 
misconduct and expelled him. In response, John sued his 
University and its officials, claiming, among other things, that the 
University proceedings were tainted with gender bias against him. 
John explained that the federal government’s pressure on the 
University to address sexual assault issues, combined with student 
activism to raise awareness about campus sexual assault, 
influenced his University to find him guilty—all because he is a 
male and the victim of reverse gender discrimination.2  
The conversation surrounding sexual discrimination, sexual 
harassment, and sexual misconduct in general has undergone a 
 
 1. The following facts are based on the factual allegations in Doe v. Colgate 
University, No. 5:15-CV-1069 (LEK/DEP), 2017 WL 4990629 (N.D.N.Y. Oct. 31, 
2017), which is further discussed infra Part IV.B.1.  
 2. While men and women can both be victims or perpetrators of sexual 
assault, for the purposes of this Note and its discussion of reverse Title IX claims, 
the plaintiff/accused will be referred to with masculine pronouns and the 
victim/accuser will be referred to with feminine pronouns.  
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drastic transformation over the past few years.3 The volume of 
public discussion regarding sexual assault on college campuses, in 
particular, has significantly increased in recent years.4 The federal 
government,5 university students,6 and the public at large7 have 
begun to put pressure on universities to change their policies 
surrounding sexual assault allegations. Many universities have 
 
 3. A large portion of this conversation began in the employment setting, 
with sexual harassment being brought to the forefront under the #MeToo 
movement. For a discussion of the social movement and its effects on employment 
discrimination law, see, for example, Vicki Schultz, Open Statement on Sexual 
Harassment from Employment Discrimination Law Scholars, 71 STAN. L. REV. 
ONLINE 17 (2018) (outlining ten principles within the sexual harassment arena 
that need to be addressed in reform efforts); Joanna L. Grossman, The Aftermath 
of the #MeToo Movement, JUSTIA (June 26, 2018), https://perma.cc/2KZF-445C 
(last visited Nov. 11, 2019) (describing how the landscape has shifted 
“seismically” because of the damage that a high-profile outing under the social 
movement can have an on employer) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review).   
 4. See, e.g., Bethany A. Corbin, Riding the Wave or Drowning?: An Analysis 
of Gender Bias and Twombly/Iqbal in Title IX Accused Student Lawsuits, 85 
FORDHAM L. REV. 2665, 2676 (2017) (noting that “the dialogue surrounding sexual 
assault on campuses has grown exponentially in recent years”); Aya Gruber, Rape 
Law Revisited, 13 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 279, 280 (2016) (stating that the “volume 
of public discussion about rape . . . certainly is widespread, ever increasing and 
affecting law and policy at a rapid rate”).  
 5. See infra Part II.B (discussing the development of Title IX through 
guidance from the federal government).  
 6.  See Alexandra Brodsky, A Rising Tide: Learning About Fair 
Disciplinary Process from Title IX, 66 J. LEGAL EDUC. 822, 822–23 (2017) 
(“Student organizers, many of whom publicly identify as survivors, used a 
combination of legal complaints, public protest, and powerful narratives to 
pressure their schools—often successfully—to change their approach to sexual 
violence reports.”); David DeMatteo, Sexual Assault on College Campuses: A 
50-State Survey of Criminal Sexual Assault Statutes and Their Relevance to 
Campus Sexual Assault, 21 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 227, 227 (2015) (stating that 
“a recent series of highly publicized sexual assaults on college campuses involving 
questionable responses by academic institutions has resulted in calls for change 
from several groups” including victimized college students and their parents who 
“have expressed outrage at the response of some academic institutions”). 
 7. See Libby Sander, Quiet No Longer, Rape Survivors Put Pressure on 
Colleges, CHRON. OF HIGHER EDUC. (Aug. 12, 2013), https://perma.cc/9RCY-3WJS 
(last visited Nov. 18, 2019) (explaining that “hundreds of students and activists 
nationwide have formed a movement to force colleges to change how they handle 
reports of rape” because they are “angry with their colleges for turning a blind 
eye to sexual violence and for failing to help prevent it”) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review).  
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taken procedural and substantive efforts to address the issue of 
campus sexual misconduct.8 
Although there are vocal supporters of the policy changes, 
there are also many who oppose such measures.9 Many 
universities that have made efforts to improve and strengthen 
their sexual assault disciplinary processes have faced backlash for 
such measures.10 Some opponents view the campus disciplinary 
process as unfair to the accused students.11 Another criticism of 
 
 8. See, e.g., Michelle J. Anderson, Campus Sexual Assault Adjudication and 
Resistance to Reform, 125 YALE L.J. 1940, 1980–81 (2016) (highlighting that over 
1,000 colleges and universities now use affirmative consent rules for sexual 
misconduct and that these standards “enhance sexual autonomy” and “mirror the 
history of progressive attempts to reform rape law”); Erin E. Buzuvis, Title IX and 
Procedural Fairness: Why Disciplined Student Litigation Does Not Undermine the 
Role of Title IX in Campus Sexual Assault, 78 MONT. L. REV. 71, 71 (2017) (“The 
increase in both enforcement and public attention has motivated colleges and 
universities to improve their policies and practices for addressing sexual assault, 
including their disciplinary processes.”). 
 9. See, e.g., Corbin, supra note 4, at 2713 (stating that “the erosion of legal 
rights” by the federal government guidance on Title IX issues “is fundamentally 
problematic”); Joe Dryden, Title IX Violations Arising from Title IX 
Investigations: The Snake is Eating its Own Tail, 53 IDAHO L. REV. 639, 641 (2017) 
(“The motivation for this paper arose out of a concern for the rights of the accused 
in sexual assault investigations, and a disbelief in the statistics being used to 
justify additional governmental intrusion into the operation of public and private 
colleges and universities.”).  
 10. See Brodsky, supra note 6, at 825 (“Many Title IX opponents deploy a 
rhetoric of ‘overcorrection’ and a pendulum swinging too far, as though a single 
axis of justice exists on which every gain for one side is a loss for the other.”); 
Naomi M. Mann, Taming Title IX Tensions, 20 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 631, 634 (2018) 
(“One paramount concern has been that in the resultant rush to protect victims 
and comply with [Office of Civil Rights (OCR)]’s new policies, schools did not 
adequately protect the accused students’ procedural due process rights.”); Tyra 
Singleton, Note, Conflicting Definitions of Sexual Assault and Consent: The 
Ramifications of Title IX Male Gender Discrimination Claims Against College 
Campuses, 28 HASTINGS WOMEN’S L.J. 155, 172 (2017) (“It is not a rare occurrence 
that institutions, relying on state funding and private endowments, will be 
swayed by public opinion as it makes controversial decisions.”) 
 11. See Brodsky, supra note 6, at 831 (“Many critics have painted recent 
survivor-protective efforts by the Department of Education, tasked with enforcing 
Title IX, as an attack on accused students’ rights.”); Corbin, supra note 4, at 2715 
(“Accused assailants frequently endure skewed investigatory and adjudicatory 
processes that lack basic truth-seeking structures.”); Diane L. Rosenfeld, 
Uncomfortable Conversations: Confronting the Reality of Target Rape on Campus, 
128 HARV. L. REV. F. 359, 369 (2015) (“Critics argue that alleged instances of 
sexual assault are often mere miscommunications, in which an alleged 
perpetrator believes that consent has been given when in fact it has not.”).  
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the university disciplinary model generally is that the issues 
should not be handled administratively but rather processed 
through the criminal justice system.12 These critics often 
emphasize the seriousness of the allegations being made against 
accused students.13 Opponents also defend accused students using 
rhetoric such as the “he had such a bright future” argument in 
order to highlight the negative consequences for those being found 
responsible under the campus disciplinary system.14  
Students accused of sexual harassment or assault have 
increasingly begun to sue their colleges and universities in order 
to seek redress for alleged unfairness during their university’s 
disciplinary proceedings.15 The accused students pursue many 
theories of liability, including breach of contract,16 denial of 
 
 12. See Anderson, supra note 8, at 1994 (stating that “[d]espite a long and 
continued history of bias against victims of sexual assault, oft-repeated 
arguments by opponents of Title IX tend to idealize the criminal law and 
disparage the campus disciplinary system” as “ill equipped to handle complaints,” 
unlike “the criminal justice system where real justice resides”); DeMatteo, supra 
note 6, at 227 (explaining that there has been “significant debate regarding how 
much the criminal justice system can and should be involved when sexual 
assaults occur on college campuses”); Dryden, supra note 9, at 677 (arguing that 
guilt or innocence “should not be determined by the media, or by the court of 
public opinion, or by potentially biased school administrators who are trying to 
avoid negative publicity and the ire of the OCR” but rather “should be 
administered in front of an impartial tribunal”). But see Brodsky, supra note 6, at 
829–30 (“In many critics’ misguided judgment, the obvious solution to school 
disciplinary failures is to cede all authority to police.”).  
 13.  See Brodsky, supra note 6, at 841 (“[C]ritics bemoan the failure 
of campus ‘rape trials’ to live up to the standards of actual criminal rape  
trials— thus styling Title IX’s protections for victims as fundamentally at odds 
with expected protections for the accused . . . .”); Singleton, supra note 10, at 156 
(“[F]inding an accused student responsible for sexual misconduct carries a 
seriousness within both a university judicial system and larger society. An 
accused student’s good name, reputation, honor, integrity, and liberty are at 
stake.”).  
 14.  See Anderson, supra note 8, at 1992–93 (“The sympathy many express 
for those accused of sexual assault in campus proceedings, which have extremely 
limited consequences relative to the criminal justice system, contrasts sharply 
with the disdain society has expressed for sex offenders outside of the campus 
setting.”).  
 15. See infra notes 16–87 and accompanying text (highlighting examples of 
claims against universities and the theories of liability students have pursued).  
 16. See, e.g., Doe v. Amherst Coll., 238 F. Supp. 3d 195, 220 (D. Mass. 2017) 
(finding that a male student expelled for violating his private college’s sexual 
misconduct policy alleged sufficient bases for his breach of contract claim because 
the fact-finding process was not impartial and fair, as promised in the school’s 
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constitutional due process rights,17 breach of the implied covenant 
of good faith and fair dealing,18 defamation,19 estoppel,20 tortious 
interference,21 and more.22 Students have also pursued claims 
 
policies and procedures); Doe v. Trs. of the Univ. of Pa., 270 F. Supp. 3d 799, 
807– 08 (E.D. Pa. 2017) (stating that a university could be held liable for a breach 
of contract claim when it did not train investigators and hearing panel members 
as outlined in its disciplinary procedure policies).  
 17.  See, e.g., Gischel v. Univ. of Cincinnati, 302 F. Supp. 3d 961, 978–79 
(S.D. Ohio 2018) (concluding that a student had presented plausible allegations 
that the university had violated his procedural due process rights by not allowing 
him to mount a meaningful defense against the sexual assault claim); Tanyi v. 
Appalachian State Univ., No. 5:14-CV-170RLV, 2015 WL 4478853, at *7 
(W.D.N.C. July 22, 2015) (stating that the university official made a decision 
against the student that could be considered arbitrary or motivated by bad faith, 
allowing the student’s substantive due process claim to proceed); see also J. Brad 
Reich, When Is Due Process Due?: Title IX, “The State,” and Public College and 
University Sexual Violence Procedures, 11 CHARLESTON L. REV. 1, 19–27 (2017) 
(discussing why due process protections are necessary during public university 
Title IX disputes to protect the presumed innocence of alleged offenders). 
 18. See Amherst, 238 F. Supp. 3d at 220 (finding that a jury could reasonably 
conclude that the college denied the student a fair adjudication of the complaint 
against him, thereby breaching the covenant of good faith and fair dealing).  
 19. See Wells v. Xavier Univ., 7 F. Supp. 3d 746, 749–50 (S.D. Ohio 2014) 
(allowing a male student’s libel claims against his university to survive a motion 
to dismiss because the university’s statements regarding his expulsion marked 
him as a person expelled for a serious violation). 
 20. See Doe v. Case W. Reserve Univ., No. 1:17-CV-414, 2017 WL 3840418, 
at *13 (N.D. Ohio Sept. 1, 2017) (determining that the university’s unambiguous 
representations and promises to not deny the student his procedural rights and 
to provide support to anyone involved could reasonably be relied on to the 
student’s detriment).  
 21. See Collick v. William Paterson Univ., No. 16-471 (KM) (JBC), 2016 WL 
6824374, at *21 (D.N.J. Nov. 17, 2016) (explaining that the university’s 
statements against two male students could constitute tortious interference with 
prospective economic advantage by severing their relationships with the 
Educational Opportunity Fund Program that provided them with loans).  
 22. See Doe v. Univ. of St. Thomas, 240 F. Supp. 3d 984, 994–95 (D. Minn. 
2017) (explaining that a negligence claim against a university can survive 
because universities could owe students a duty of care under their special 
relationships to conduct the sexual assault proceedings in a non-negligent 
manner); Dempsey v. Bucknell Univ., No. 4:11-CV-1679, 2012 WL 1569826, at 
*24 (M.D. Pa. May 3, 2012) (allowing a student’s claim for intentional infliction of 
emotional distress to survive a motion to dismiss because he had sufficiently 
alleged that officials acted intentionally, maliciously, or recklessly and that the 
student suffered severe emotional distress); Doe v. Univ. of the S., No. 4:09-CV-62, 
2011 WL 1258104, at *20 (E.D. Tenn. Mar. 31, 2011) (allowing a student to 
proceed with a quasi-contractual claim that his university was unjustly enriched 
under its policies regarding sexual assault). 
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against their universities alleging reverse gender discrimination 
under Title IX of the Education Amendments Act.23 
Title IX states that “[n]o person in the United States shall, on 
the basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the 
benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any education 
program . . . .”24 Title IX was originally enacted because “Congress 
wanted to avoid the use of federal resources to support 
discriminatory practices” and “to provide individual citizens 
effective protection against those practices.”25 Students who have 
experienced sexual harassment26 or sexual assault27 in the 
educational context may take action under Title IX.28 Additionally, 
students accused of sexual harassment or assault have brought 
claims against universities under reverse Title IX theories.29 This 
Note examines if, and to what degree, courts should consider the 
pressure put on universities to address sexual misconduct on 
campus as support for an accused student’s Title IX claim of gender 
discrimination during university disciplinary proceedings. 
This Note begins in Part II by discussing the prevalence of 
campus sexual assault and the ways in which Title IX is used to 
address it on university campuses. Part III examines reverse Title 
IX claims by accused students, including the various causes of 
action and the pleading standards required. Part III also surveys 
 
 23. 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (2018). 
 24. Id.  
 25. Cannon v. Univ. of Chi., 441 U.S. 677, 704 (1979).  
 26. See Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 64 (1986) (determining 
that unwelcome sexual advances constitute sex discrimination if they render a 
workplace hostile to the members of a sex).  
 27. See Soper v. Hoben, 195 F.3d 845, 855 (6th Cir. 1999) (stating that sexual 
abuse and assault “obviously qualify as . . . severe, pervasive, and objectively 
offensive sexual harassment”).  
 28. See, e.g., Sander, supra note 7 (“Meant to prohibit sex discrimination at 
institutions that receive federal funds, the law requires colleges to investigate and 
resolve reports of sexual misconduct, including assault . . . .”). For a discussion of 
the effect of sexual violence in other educational settings, see Emma Brown, 
Sexual Violence Isn’t Just a College Problem. It Happens in K-12 Schools, Too., 
WASH. POST (Jan. 17, 2019), https://perma.cc/3MY2-BKHU (last visited Nov. 11, 
2019) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 29. See infra Part III; see also Corbin, supra note 4, at 2714 (“The climate of 
Title IX sexual assault litigation is changing. Previously viewed as a victim 
protections statute, Title IX is increasingly being invoked by accused perpetrators 
of sexual violence to demand fair and equitable disciplinary proceedings.”).  
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the success of reverse Title IX claims using public pressure on 
universities to address sexual assault to support their allegations 
of gender discrimination. Part IV then evaluates the way summary 
judgment rules and burden-shifting frameworks affect the 
likelihood of success for reverse Title IX claims. Finally, Part V 
emphasizes the need for clarity and consistency in the evaluation 
of reverse Title IX claims. In considering the purposes and policies 
of Title IX, this Note ultimately argues that reverse Title IX claims, 
especially those relying on external pressure on universities, 
should be assessed in a strict and limited manner going forward. 
This Note concludes in Part VI by discussing the possibilities of 
proposed changes to federal regulations and their impact on 
reverse Title IX claims. 
II. Overview of Campus Sexual Assault 
A. Campus Sexual Assault 
In the modern climate,30 there is a great deal of tension on 
college campuses regarding rape culture and sexual assault.31 
College campus conversations relating to sexual assault are 
 
 30. See Anderson, supra note 8, at 1969 (“An increasing awareness of the 
widespread nature of campus sexual assault facilitated legal change at the state 
and federal level to address it. No matter to which study one refers, campus sexual 
assault is a large problem.”); Gruber, supra note 4, at 279–83 (discussing the 
“post-millennial sex war” and stating that “the claim that rape is a widespread 
and worsening problem that affects all women and reflects deep gender inequality 
is no longer just a feminist mantra, but an increasingly accepted, uncontroversial, 
and even undebatable claim”); Diane Heckman, The Proliferation of Title IX 
Collegiate Mishandling Cases Involving Sexual Misconduct Between 2016–2018: 
The March to the Federal Circuit Courts, 358 ED. L. REP. 697, 698 (2018) 
(asserting that the nomination of Justice Kavanaugh to the Supreme Court 
“acutely put sexual misconduct on the national landscape, with the televised 
hearings, radio, and press coverage”). 
 31. See DeMatteo, supra note 6, at 227 (“A recent series of highly publicized 
campus sexual assaults and the questionable responses by the academic 
institutions where they occurred has led some policymakers and academic 
administrators to call for legislative and institutional change.”); Laura L. Dunn, 
Addressing Sexual Violence in Higher Education: Ensuring Compliance with the 
Clery Act, Title IX and VAWA, 15 GEO. J. GENDER & L. 563, 564 (2014) (“Unlike 
ever before, there is national pressure on colleges and universities to address 
campus sexual violence.”).  
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currently quite polarized, impassioned, and controversial.32 
Despite the fact that both sides of the argument appear to be rooted 
in a value for students’ access to education, the debate instead 
focuses on the consequences for either the accused or the accuser 
in sexual assault situations.33 
Evidence shows that campus sexual assault is a serious 
problem.34 Even with the significant data that exists regarding the 
prevalence of sexual assault and harassment on college 
campuses,35 the statistics likely understate the actual 
pervasiveness due, at least in part, to underreporting by victims.36 
Common reasons for the low reporting of sexual assault incidents37 
 
 32. See, e.g., Annaleigh E. Curtis, Due Process Demands as Propaganda: The 
Rhetoric of Title IX Opposition, 29 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 273, 278–81 (2017) 
(outlining how rape culture is a “social phenomenon” that can give rise to 
“propagandistic speech”); Rosenfeld, supra note 11, at 359 (“The longstanding 
epidemic of campus sexual assault has finally reached a flashpoint, igniting a 
national dialogue.”). 
 33. See Brodsky, supra note 6, at 827–28 (discussing the shared values 
between the two “warring interests” based on the shared “unifying principle” 
centering around “the need to combat unjust deprivations of the right to learn, 
whether the threat is unaddressed gender violence or, less frequently, false 
accusations”). Despite Brodsky’s belief that shared values unite both sides of the 
argument, she also refers to the national discussion as “the ill-informed circus of 
debate on Title IX” and “a wrongheaded and counterproductive battle.” Id. at 848.  
 34. See Dunn, supra note 31, at 565 (“While murder rarely occurs on college 
and university campuses, sexual violence is endemic.”).  
 35. See generally Corey Rayburn Yung, Concealing Campus Sexual Assault: 
An Empirical Examination, 21 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 1 (2015) (evaluating not 
only the data reported by universities regarding campus sexual assault but also 
the discrepancy between rates reported before and after an audit and theorizing 
that universities undercount incidents of sexual assault).  
 36. See, e.g., DeMatteo, supra note 6, at 228 (stating that “[e]ven more 
striking than the published statistics on the prevalence of college sexual assaults 
is the likelihood that these reported statistics significantly underestimate the 
actual prevalence of campus sexual assaults due to remarkably low levels of 
incident reporting”); Rosenfeld, supra note 11, at 367 (“Roughly one-third of 
students who experience unwanted sex do not report the incident to anyone, 
including friends or family. No more than 10% report their experiences to a school 
official.”) (emphasis in original).  
 37. See Rosenfeld, supra note 11, at 367 (citing the reasons for not reporting 
as including “fear of not being believed or taken seriously, not knowing it was 
sexual assault, not wanting others to know about the experience, belief that 
nothing will be done, insufficient proof, and fear of retaliation from the offender 
or his friends”); Grayson Sang Walker, Note, The Evolution and Limits of Title IX 
Doctrine on Peer Sexual Assault, 45 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 95, 98 (2010) (“Filing 
a formal complaint with school officials often triggers a lengthy and embarrassing 
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include wariness regarding the school’s investigatory and 
adjudicatory processes, lack of awareness about the definition and 
classification of sexual assault, the victim’s fear of retaliation, and 
lack of punishment given to perpetrators.38 If colleges and 
universities are to truly “effectively address campus sexual 
violence,” they “must develop progressive campus policies to 
contend with these realities.”39 Recent university reform under 
Title IX has sought to do just that. 
B. Title IX and Federal Guidance 
Traditionally, most of the focus of Title IX enforcement has 
been aimed at addressing gender discrimination by providing 
female athletes in university sports with equal opportunities.40 In 
2011, the Department of Education (DOE) and the Office for Civil 
Rights (OCR) published a Dear Colleague Letter (DCL),41 which 
adjusted the goals of Title IX. The 2011 DCL drew attention to sex 
discrimination on college campuses outside of the athletic context 
and shifted the focus of Title IX enforcement toward addressing 
issues of campus sexual assault.42 The Trump administration has 
 
investigation, even if the case is never referred to a local prosecutor. Survivors 
naturally fear a loss of privacy and control during this process . . . .”).  
 38. See Brodsky, supra note 29, at 2678–79 (discussing the mindsets of 
sexual violence survivors including the victims’ discouragement regarding the 
“lax punishment afforded to perpetrators by university officials”). For a discussion 
of the “range of penalties associated with administrative adjudication of campus 
sexual assault cases” and the reluctance of schools to expel sexual assault 
perpetrators, see DeMatteo, supra note 6, at 230.  
 39. See Dunn, supra note 31, at 565–66 (explaining that the “silent epidemic” 
which “masks the reality of perpetration on campus” stems from the inability to 
identify sexual assault, the fear of social stigma, the self-blame, and the hesitancy 
to label the perpetrator as a rapist). 
 40. See Walker, supra note 37, at 99 (explaining that “Title IX is best known 
for its role in expanding women’s sports at the high school and collegiate levels”); 
Corey Rayburn Yung, Is Relying on Title IX a Mistake?, 64 U. KAN. L. REV. 891, 
902 (2016) (“Traditionally, Title IX litigation and regulation has been focused on 
addressing unlawful disparities in athletic departments and sex discrimination 
in hierarchal relationships.”). 
 41. U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., DEAR COLLEAGUE LETTER (Apr. 4, 2011), 
https://perma.cc/5B4C-GAM2 (PDF) [hereinafter 2011 DCL].  
 42. See Katharine Silbaugh, Reactive to Proactive: Title IX’s Unrealized 
Capacity to Prevent Campus Sexual Assault, 95 B.U. L. REV. 1049, 1065 (2015) 
(stating that the 2011 DCL, in particular, has “shifted the equality conception of 
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abandoned many of the requirements and protections reinforced 
under the 2011 DCL.43 New policies will likely be enforced by 
Secretary of Education Betsy DeVos and could have a significant 
impact on all forms of Title IX claims, which is discussed later in 
this Note.44 However, these changes do not impact this Note’s 
discussion of cases referencing “federal pressure,”45 which refers 
generally to federal guidance before the proposed changes, 
specifically the 2011 DCL and direction under the Obama 
Administration.46 
The 2011 DCL begins by discussing the requirements and 
responsibilities of schools to address sexual misconduct and 
“concludes by discussing the proactive efforts schools can take to 
prevent sexual harassment and violence.”47 The letter indicates 
that compliance with Title IX requires “publishing a notice of 
nondiscrimination, designating an employee to coordinate Title IX 
compliance, and adopting and publishing grievance procedures.”48 
These measures “serve as preventive measures against 
 
Title IX” to “one aimed at rape and other sexual assault on college campuses” 
which has “accelerated exponentially” the “pace of the discussion of sexual assault 
on college campuses”); see also Walker, supra note 37, at 99 (“The focus on sports 
has limited the transformative power of Title IX’s non-discrimination 
mandate . . . Title IX was intended to protect all students, not just female 
athletes, from gender discrimination in federally funded educational programs 
and activities.”) (emphasis in original).  
 43. For a general description of the Department of Education’s new policy 
and guidance under the Trump administration, including withdrawal of the 2011 
DCL, see Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Educ., Dep’t of Educ. Issues New Interim 
Guidance on Campus Sexual Misconduct (Sept. 22, 2017), 
https://perma.cc/C24Y-4V2P (last visited Nov. 11, 2019) [hereinafter 2017 Press 
Release] (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 44. See infra Part VI.  
 45. See Silbaugh, supra note 42, at 1065 (“Both fueled by the public 
discussion of campus sexual assault and also fueling the discussion, the DOE is a 
significant player in raising the profile of this issue in the past several years.”). 
 46. See Doe v. Colgate Univ., No. 5:15-CV-1069 (LEK/DEP), 2017 WL 
4990629, at *13 (N.D.N.Y. Oct. 31, 2017) (stating that the “2017 DCL does not 
impact the Court’s analysis of Plaintiff’s Title IX claim” because updated 
interpretation “simply demonstrates that OCR can ‘from time to time change its 
interpretation’ of a statute” and does not mean that the University’s compliance 
with the 2011 guidelines violated Title IX (quoting Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. 
Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 863 (1984))). 
 47. See 2011 DCL, supra note 41, at 2 (providing examples of ways that 
schools can “end such conduct, prevent its recurrence, and address its effects”). 
 48. Id. at 5. 
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harassment” and “bring potentially problematic conduct to the 
school’s attention before it becomes serious enough to create a 
hostile environment.”49 While universities are threatened with loss 
of federal funding for failure to comply with Title IX requirements, 
Title IX also provides universities with a mechanism to more 
proactively address campus sexual assault.50  
Sexual violence is an extreme example of sexual harassment, 
which is a subset of the sexual discrimination forbidden under 
Title IX.51 According to the 2011 DCL, “[a] number of different acts 
fall into the category of sexual violence, including rape, sexual 
assault, sexual battery and sexual coercion,” all of which “are 
forms of sexual harassment covered under Title IX.”52 Sexual 
harassment consists of any “unwelcome conduct of a sexual 
nature,” which also includes “unwelcome sexual advances, request 
for sexual favors, and other verbal, nonverbal, or physical conduct 
of a sexual nature.”53 To be actionable under Title IX, the sexual 
discrimination must have a connection to the complainant’s ability 
to access her education54 because “Title IX guarantees protections 
 
 49. Id. at 5–6.  
 50. See Mann, supra note 10, at 6333 (stating that Title IX serves as a 
starting place for addressing sexual assault complaints because, “[a]s is typical 
for a civil rights statute, Title IX codifies the societal interest in protecting victims 
against certain types of discrimination and requires schools to provide an equal 
access to education”); see also Brodsky, supra note 6, at 823 (“Decades after an 
appellate court first held that the sex discrimination law Title IX requires schools 
to address allegations of sexual harassment, many colleges undertook serious 
reform efforts, recognizing the legal and reputational threat of their own 
noncompliance with civil rights law for the first time.” (referencing Alexander v. 
Yale Univ., 631 F.2d 178, 181–83 (2d Cir. 1980))). But see Yung, supra note 40, at 
893 (arguing that “it is a mistake to solely or primarily depend on Title IX to deter 
and punish offenders in university sexual assault cases” because of the 
“uncertainty related to various aspects of Title IX doctrine and the regulatory 
regime that has emerged to enforce the statute”).  
 51. See Yung, supra note 40, at 895 (providing a chart explaining the 
subcategories but clarifying that “[d]espite the assumption that sexual assault is 
a subset of sexual harassment, there are numerous differences between 
university sexual assault cases and the more typical sexual harassment claims 
brought under Title IX”).  
 52. 2011 DCL, supra note 41, at 1–2.  
 53. Id. at 3.  
 54. See Mann, supra note 10, at 641–42 (“There are many ways in which the 
two can be tied; examples include claims of being unable to attend class or engage 
in shared activities (such as the dining hall) for fear of encountering the accused 
student.”). For a further explanation of the connection between sexual assault, 
FLIP IT AND REVERSE IT 1837 
to student survivors of gender violence because such violence 
creates an unconscionable sex-based obstacle to the pursuit of an 
education.”55  
A significant development from the 2011 DCL came from the 
ways in which it “strengthened the rights and protections for 
victims of sexual misconduct and affirmed the university’s 
proactive obligations to eliminate sexual violence.”56 On the other 
hand, the shift toward sexual violence victim protection was 
accompanied by an increase in perpetrator victim mentality, which 
further contributes to the polarized debate on college campuses.57 
Although the 2011 DCL is not binding law or rulemaking,58 the 
federal government threatened to investigate and withhold federal 
funding from universities who did not comply, putting significant 
pressure on universities to address sexual assault.59 Many 
students and scholars claim that this public pressure on 
universities makes them inevitably unfair places for adjudication 
of the issues.60 Some scholars view balancing the rights of the 
 
sexual harassment, and sex discrimination, see Yung, supra note 40, at 895–98 
(explaining that “[m]any of the shortcomings related to Title IX’s application to 
peer-to-peer sexual assault cases arise because the statute, by its own terms, 
must confront such cases as a form of sexual harassment which, in turn, is a form 
of sex discrimination”).  
 55. Brodsky, supra note 6, at 828. 
 56. Corbin, supra note 4, at 2676.  
 57. See Buzuvis, supra note 8, at 85 (theorizing that the trend of cases 
involving disciplined students after the 2011 DCL is explained “by increased 
reporting of sexual assault and the corresponding increase in the number of 
students disciplined” due to universities’ altered disciplinary practices). 
 58. See Silbaugh, supra note 42, at 1064 (explaining that while each of the 
OCR’s Dear Colleague Letters “carries less formal weight than regulations or 
Guidance, colleges and universities respond to them wisely as expressions of 
OCR’s intentions in conducting investigations of colleges for compliance with Title 
IX”); see also Brodsky, supra note 6, at 823 (explaining that “counternarrative[s] 
emerged from some law professors, reporters, libertarians critical of the 
administrative state, and those skeptical of the existence of campus rape: that 
schools, in their attempts to conform to the Department of Education’s 
nonbinding recommendations, were now violating the rights of students accused 
of gender violence”). 
 59. See Silbaugh, supra note 42, at 1065 (“The DOE is signaling its active 
use of administrative enforcement of Title IX to address peer assault since the 
2011 Dear Colleague [L]etter, and colleges are scrambling to react. . . . Colleges 
feel greatly increased pressure to do what the DOE is requiring . . . .”).  
 60. See, e.g., Singleton, supra note 10, at 155 (“[M]any colleges and 
universities, in an effort to comply, went outside the scope of what Title IX 
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accused with the rights of the complainant as an impossible 
situation for universities to balance.61 Either way, universities are 
open to civil liability under Title IX,62 especially if their established 
grievance procedures and disciplinary processes are not strictly 
followed. 
C. University Disciplinary Processes 
Generally, student victims who experience sexual assault 
have a few options, including pursuing criminal and civil cases 
against the perpetrators.63 Additionally, students have the option 
to seek relief through their educational institutions. 
Educational institutions provide remedies that are unique to 
the educational setting,64 and the educational forum can have 
 
required and developed procedures that are overwhelmingly stacked against the 
accused and infringe on the accused’s constitutional rights.”). Compare Stephen 
Henrick, A Hostile Environment for Student Defendants: Title IX and Sexual 
Assault on College Campuses, 40 N. KY. L. REV. 49, 80–83 (2013) (arguing that 
universities should not handle sexual assault claims because of their inevitable 
bias stemming from public pressure to punish sexual misconduct more 
aggressively), with Brodsky, supra note 6, at 825 (“[I]n the narrower college rape 
context, many advocates and most popular accounts tell a tale of warring 
interests. Schools can either prevent and respond to gender violence or protect 
accused students’ rights; these aims are imagined to be entirely mutually 
exclusive.”).  
 61. But see Holly Hogan, The Real Choice in a Perceived Catch-22: Providing 
Fairness to Both the Accused and Complaining Students in College Sexual Assault 
Disciplinary Proceedings, 38 J.L. & EDUC. 277, 293 (2009) (stating that neither 
due process nor Title IX “creates a ‘Catch 22’ for colleges and universities” because 
“each provides procedural safeguards that are congruent with the other, and thus 
schools do not have to choose between the rights of the accused student or the 
rights of the student complainant”).  
 62. See Yung, supra note 40, at 902 (“Because the university might be sued 
in either case, likely under Title IX in both situations, it is in a situation ripe with 
potential conflicts of interest. A litigation-averse university will likely pursue the 
course least likely to create civil liability.”).  
 63. See Mann, supra note 10, at 639 (describing the avenues and remedies 
available to sexual assault student victims, including “contacting the police to see 
if a criminal case could be pursued, filing a civil tort case, filing a civil restraining 
order, and/or pursuing actions at the student’s educational institution”).  
 64. See Walker, supra note 37, at 98–99 (“Universities possess a wide range 
of remedial powers, including orders of protection, suspension, and expulsion.”).  
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many advantages65 over the criminal66 and civil67 fora. Campus 
disciplinary proceedings can “provide survivors with access to 
justice and remove threats to the student body” without requiring 
formal court proceedings.68 However, “nothing prevents the dual 
adjudication of campus sexual assaults,”69 and student victims 
may pursue an administrative remedy through university 
proceedings while also seeking redress through the court system. 
The required characteristics of university Title IX disciplinary 
proceedings changed significantly with the 2011 DCL and are 
continuously undergoing further change under the Trump 
Administration.70 The 2011 DCL provided significant guidance as 
to adequate grievance procedures and “devotes, conservatively 
counted, fifteen of the nineteen pages to how a college should 
respond to a sexual assault.”71 First, Title IX compliance requires 
notice to students and employees of the grievance procedures, 
including the appropriate place to file complaints.72 Next, schools 
 
 65. See Mann, supra note 10, at 640  
Student victims often turn first to their educational institution for 
remedies because this is the most effective and direct way they can get 
what they need to continue their education. [They] often prefer to see 
remedies from their community directly, rather than proceeding 
through the civil or criminal process . . . . 
 66. See id. at 639 (describing how officers rather than victims are in charge 
of criminal cases and that the “punishment would not necessarily assist the 
student victim with remaining at school pending the outcome of the criminal 
case”). 
 67. See id. at 640 (acknowledging that civil cases are often lengthy and 
“courts are often reluctant to issue stay-away orders that affect the accused 
student’s ability to attend class, as they view this as interfering with the 
educational institution’s sphere of authority”). 
 68. See Walker, supra note 37, at 99 (noting that campus proceedings do not 
necessitate the participation of law enforcement authorities and require a lower 
burden of proof than a criminal trial).  
 69. See DeMatteo, supra note 6, at 230 (“Simultaneously pursuing remedies 
through the academic institution and criminal justice system would provide 
victims with a range of options in seeking redress for the offense.”).  
 70. See infra Part VI (outlining the impact of the 2017 DCL and DeVos’s 
proposed regulation).  
 71. See Silbaugh, supra note 42, at 1066 (explaining the DCL includes 
“guidance on training employees to recognize and report a sexual assault that has 
occurred; the duties of a Title IX coordinator to oversee complaints of sexual 
assault; and the requirements of an adequate grievance procedure for addressing 
complaints of sexual assault”).  
 72. See 2011 DCL, supra note 41, at 9 (recommending that the grievance 
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are required to provide “equitable grievance procedures,” which 
are “adequate, reliable and impartial” and generally include 
“conduct[ing] investigations and hearings to determine whether 
sexual harassment or violence occurred.”73 Traditionally under 
Title IX, once the educational institution has actual or constructive 
notice of potential sexual discrimination, the statute obligates the 
school to act in response.74 
The 2011 DCL indicated that “preponderance of the evidence 
is the appropriate standard for investigating allegations of sexual 
harassment or violence.”75 The letter also states that Title IX 
requires that a school allow both parties an equal opportunity to 
present relevant witnesses and other evidence at the investigation 
and hearing and give both parties “similar and timely access to any 
information that will be used at the hearing.”76 OCR indicated that 
it would regulate whether the schools’ grievance procedures specify 
reasonably prompt time frames within which the procedures will 
take place.77 The 2011 DCL makes clear that “[w]hen OCR finds 
that a school has not taken prompt and effective steps to respond 
to sexual harassment or violence, [it] will seek appropriate 
 
procedures “be prominently posted on school Web sites; sent electronically to all 
members of the school community; available at various locations throughout the 
school or campus; and summarized in or attached to major publications issued by 
the school”).  
 73. Id. at 9–10.  
 74. See Corbin, supra note 4, at 2677 (“When a university knows or 
reasonably should know of an incident of sexual violence, it must take action to 
eliminate the harassing environment.”); Silbaugh, supra note 42, at 1066 (“Any 
fair reading of the [2011] DCL leads to the conclusion that its primary goal is to 
communicate to colleges and universities how they must conduct their discipline 
or grievance processes after learning of a possible sexual assault in order to 
remain in compliance with Title IX.”). This rule was enforced under the 2011 
DCL. See 2011 DCL, supra note 41, at 4. However, the proposed regulations under 
the current administration seek to eliminate the “reasonably should know” 
requirement.  
 75. See 2011 DCL, supra note 41, at 11 (stating that school procedures which 
currently use the “clear and convincing standard” are inconsistent with the 
standard of proof used in civil rights violations, making them inequitable under 
Title IX).  
 76. Id.  
 77. See id. (“Based on OCR experience, a typical investigation takes 
approximately 60 calendar days following receipt of the complaint. Whether OCR 
considers complaint resolutions to be timely, however, will vary depending on the 
complexity of the investigation and the severity and extent of the harassment.”). 
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remedies for both the complainant and the broader student 
population,” which could include withdrawal of federal funding by 
the DOE or referral to the U.S. Department of Justice for 
litigation.78 Notably, the 2011 DCL explicitly states that “schools 
should ensure that steps taken to accord due process rights to the 
alleged perpetrator do not restrict or unnecessarily delay the Title 
IX protections for the complainant,” seemingly emphasizing 
complainant discrimination protections over the procedural rights 
of the accused.79 
D. Title IX and Due Process 
In general, the 2011 DCL Title IX guidance provides “more 
robust procedural protections for both parties than does the 
Constitution—or any other federal law or regulation.”80 While the 
Constitution applies only to public schools that function as an arm 
of the state, Title IX applies to any school receiving federal 
funding. The Constitution provides some procedural due process 
rights to students at public universities, but “students at private 
schools have no procedural due-process rights; the fairness of their 
schools’ disciplinary processes is a matter of contract, and 
disciplinarians need only conform to their written policies.”81 In 
this way, Title IX as applied to gender violence presents “a more 
robust vision of fair process on campus than does the 
Constitution.”82 It broadens the scope of protection because it 
extends “for the first time in federal law a basic fair-process 
mandate to all private universities that receive any federal 
assistance, not just those public schools subject to constitutional 
due-process requirements.”83 
 
 78. Id. at 16.  
 79. Id. at 12. 
 80. Brodsky, supra note 6, at 831.  
 81. Id. But see Buzuvis, supra note 8, at 101 (“Though the Constitution’s Due 
Process Clause does not bind private colleges, courts have in many cases insisted 
that private universities have an obligation not to treat students unfairly or with 
malice,” which “is sometimes rooted in the contract doctrine of good faith and fair 
dealing.”).  
 82. Brodsky, supra note 6, at 832.  
 83. Id. at 836.  
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While due process discussions are often intertwined with Title 
IX procedural violations, due process claims individually against a 
university are typically more successful than Title IX claims.84 Due 
process claims “can survive motions to dismiss, and even win 
outright, without the unnecessary step of linking procedural error 
to gender bias.”85 The claims also sometimes avoid the negative 
backlash that results from a reverse Title IX claim  — “because 
universities’ due process obligations do not conflict with those 
under Title IX, litigation on due process grounds can hold 
universities accountable for procedural fairness without 
weakening the university’s sexual assault response or exposing the 
university to a risk of liability under Title IX.”86 Because many 
Title IX theories can be supported by evidence of procedural flaws, 
due process violations are often discussed in relation to Title IX 
violations. However, it is important to remember that the two 
claims are distinct from one another.  
III. Stating a Reverse Title IX Claim  
Many courts recognize a cause of action under Title IX for a 
student accused of sexual assault against a university for 
discrimination in disciplinary proceedings if it appears the 
student’s gender influenced the disciplinary action.87 These claims 
 
 84. See Corbin, supra note 4, at 2712–13 (noting that “the current pleading 
climate suggests that due process and breach of contract actions . . . are easier to 
plead and thus more likely to proceed to discovery”); Yung, supra note 40, at 897 
(stating that Title IX requirements can be difficult for plaintiffs to meet because 
“[i]f a plaintiff does not show clear evidence of a decline in academic performance 
due directly to sexual victimization or denial of university services, Title IX might 
not apply”).  
 85. Buzuvis, supra note 8, at 101. 
 86. Id. 
 87. See Doe v. Columbia Univ., 831 F.3d 46, 57–59 (2d Cir. 2016) (recognizing 
a cause of action if the university discipline is motivated by the student’s gender); 
Yusuf v. Vassar Coll., 35 F.3d 709, 714–16 (2d Cir. 1994) (acknowledging a cause 
of action and dividing the claims into two categories based on erroneous outcome 
and selective enforcement); Doe v. Marymount Univ., 297 F. Supp. 3d 573, 589– 87 
(E.D. Va. 2018) (stating that a cause of action could arise from a university’s 
disciplinary proceedings if the university demonstrated gender bias against an 
accused male student); Saravanan v. Drexel Univ., No. 17-3409, 2017 WL 
4532243, at *4 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 10, 2017) (recognizing that a male student accused 
of sexual harassment and stalking, whose gender was a motivating factor for the 
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have drawn on many aspects of the disciplinary process as 
evidence of discrimination88 and had varied success at different 
stages of litigation.89 Title IX is enforceable through an implied 
private right of action,90 the remedy being monetary damages91 or 
injunctive relief.92  
A recent trend in these claims is that students will use the 
public pressure put on universities as evidence that the university 
was biased against them.93 It is not always clear if this strategy is 
based in “political outrage,”94 but the claims often do serve 
 
university’s deciding to discipline, had a cause of action); Doe v. Case W. Reserve 
Univ., No. 1:17-CV-414, 2017 WL 3840418, at *3 (N.D. Ohio Sept. 1, 2017) (stating 
that a private cause of action exists because a university is not allowed to 
implement discipline if gender is a motivating factor behind the decision); Doe v. 
Lynn Univ., Inc., 224 F. Supp. 3d 1288, 1291 (S.D. Fla. 2016) (recognizing a cause 
of action that could be divided into selective enforcement and erroneous outcome 
challenges); Ritter v. Okla. City Univ., No. CIV-16-0438-HE, 2016 WL 3982554, 
at *2 (W.D. Okla. July 22, 2016) (allowing a cause of action for a male student 
claiming gender discrimination in his university’s disciplinary action); Doe v. 
Brown Univ., 166 F. Supp. 3d 177, 185 (D.R.I. 2016) (recognizing a cause of action 
if gender is a motivating factor behind a university’s disciplinary action).  
 88. See, e.g., infra notes 105–109 and accompanying text.  
 89. See, e.g., Doe v. Valencia Coll., 903 F.3d 1220, 1236 (11th Cir. 2018) 
(evaluating an erroneous outcome challenge to university disciplinary 
proceedings on a motion for summary judgment by the University); Doe v. George 
Washington Univ., 305 F. Supp. 3d 126, 133–34 (D.D.C. 2018) (evaluating an 
accused student’s claim at the preliminary injunction stage and concluding he did 
not sufficiently demonstrate a likelihood to succeed on the merits); Rolph v. 
Hobart & William Smith Colls., 271 F. Supp. 3d 386, 399–404 (W.D.N.Y. 2017) 
(evaluating the plaintiff’s Title IX claims at a motion to dismiss and deciding that 
the plaintiff had stated a claim under erroneous outcome, but not under selective 
enforcement). 
 90. See Cannon v. Univ. of Chi., 441 U.S. 677, 709 (1979) (“Not only the 
words and history of Title IX, but also its subject matter and underlying purposes, 
counsel implication of a cause of action in favor of private victims of 
discrimination.”).  
 91. See Franklin v. Gwinnett Cty. Pub. Sch., 503 U.S. 60, 76 (1992) 
(concluding that “a damages remedy is available for an action brought to enforce 
Title IX”). 
 92. See Fitzgerald v. Barnstable Sch. Comm., 555 U.S. 246, 247 (2009) 
(explaining that Title IX allows for a plaintiff to seek the full range of remedies, 
including injunctive relief (citing Franklin, 503 U.S. at 76)).  
 93. See infra notes 134–137 and accompanying text.  
 94. See Corbin, supra note 4, at 2712–13 (“The driving force behind reverse 
Title IX actions is the desire to proclaim political outrage at the extent to which 
OCR has manipulated the educational disciplinary framework . . . . Because OCR 
failed to equally protect male students, alleged perpetrators have no choice but to 
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(whether intentionally or unintentionally) a political agenda aimed 
at protections for the accused.95 
A. Causes of Action 
Most courts have explicitly recognized at least four Title IX 
theories of liability under which a student may attack his 
university’s disciplinary proceedings on the basis of gender bias 
against him96: (1) erroneous outcome;97 (2) selective enforcement;98 
(3) deliberate indifference;99 and (4) archaic assumptions.100 
Occasionally a plaintiff will bring claims under 
 
seek judicial relief.”). Corbin also blames the universities for the need for such 
claims, stating that “the closure of justice’s doors during the university 
disciplinary process has forced accused students to seek vindication of their rights 
in courts of law.” Id. at 2685. 
 95. See Buzuvis, supra note 8, at 107 
[D]iscplined-student plaintiffs’ emphasis on Title IX claims 
contributes, perhaps by design, to anti-feminist backlash. Because 
Title IX’s application to sexual assault is destabilizing to those who 
participate in and benefit from the cultural association of masculinity 
with power that stems from rape, it may be the case that some 
disciplined-student plaintiffs find particular satisfaction in attacking 
the university with the same weapon that resulted in their expulsion 
in the first place. They may seek to impeach Title IX in the political 
arena by arguing that the statute is inherently contradictory and 
biased in favor of one sex. 
 96. See Doe v. Miami Univ., 882 F.3d 579, 589–95 (6th Cir. 2018) (evaluating 
a student’s Title IX claims against his university under erroneous outcome, 
selective enforcement, and deliberate indifference theories, as well as a 
hostile-environment theory); Doe v. Rider Univ., No. 3:16-CV-4882-BRM-DEA, 
2018 WL 466225, at *8 (D.N.J. Jan. 17, 2018) (evaluating the plaintiff’s claim 
under the four theories of liability even though the Third Circuit had not 
previously analyzed a Title IX claim arising from university disciplinary 
proceedings); Stenzel v. Peterson, No. CV 17-580 (JRT/LIB), 2017 WL 4081897, 
at *4 (D. Minn. Sept. 13, 2017) (explaining that Title IX claims arising out of 
university disciplinary hearings can be analyzed under the four theories of 
liability and deciding to evaluate plaintiff’s claim under the selective enforcement 
standard).  
 97. See infra notes 104–112 and accompanying text.  
 98. See infra notes 113–115 and accompanying text.  
 99. See infra notes 117–119 and accompanying text. 
 100. See infra notes 121–123 and accompanying text. 
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hostile-environment101 and retaliatory action102 theories also. In all 
of these Title IX claims, “a plaintiff must allege facts he was 
discriminated against because of sex.”103  
Erroneous outcome challenges to university proceedings are 
the most common claims brought, as well as the most successful 
thus far. Under erroneous outcome challenges, plaintiffs assert 
that they were “innocent and wrongly found to have committed an 
offense.”104 An erroneous outcome challenge to university 
disciplinary proceedings requires a plaintiff to plead facts 
sufficient (1) to cast doubt on the accuracy of the proceeding 
against him105 and (2) to establish a causal connection between 
gender bias and the flawed outcome of the proceedings.106 The 
allegations vary from internal procedural flaws107 to error by 
individual investigators108 to external pressure upon the 
university.109 Once doubt has been cast, the plaintiff must allege 
that the erroneous outcome was caused by gender bias against 
him.110 The plaintiff must present “a particularized allegation 
 
 101. See infra notes 124–125 and accompanying text. 
 102. See infra notes 126–127 and accompanying text.  
 103. Saravanan v. Drexel Univ., No. 17-3409, 2017 WL 4532243, at *4 (E.D. 
Pa. Oct. 10, 2017) (citing Winter v. Pa. St. Univ., 172 F. Supp. 3d 756, 776 (M.D. 
Pa. 2016)) (emphasis in original).  
 104. Yusuf v. Vassar Coll., 35 F.3d 709, 715 (2d Cir. 1994). 
 105. See id. (explaining that the articulable doubt must exist from the record 
that was in front of the disciplinary tribunal at the time).  
 106. See id. (noting that the “[a]llegations of a causal connection in the case 
of university disciplinary cases can be of the kind that are found in the familiar 
setting of Title VII cases”).  
 107. See Doe v. Miami Univ., 882 F.3d 579, 592–94 (6th Cir. 2018) 
(determining that unresolved inconsistency in the female complainant’s 
statements and an erroneous definition of consent, taken with statistical evidence 
showing a “potential pattern of gender-based decision-making” and pressure on 
the University to combat sexual assault on campus, were sufficient to support 
reasonable inference of gender discrimination under erroneous outcome). 
 108. See Yusuf, 35 F.3d at 715 (stating that “some allegations, such as 
statements reflecting bias by members of the tribunal, may suffice both to cast 
doubt on the accuracy of the disciplinary adjudication and to relate the error to 
gender bias”).  
 109. See Doe v. Lynn Univ., Inc., 224 F. Supp. 3d 1288, 1342 (S.D. Fla. 2016) 
(holding that the nationwide pressure on universities along with the University’s 
representatives’ awareness of the criticism of the University’s handling of 
complaints was enough to support “the plausible inference of a causal connection 
between the flawed outcome and gender bias”). 
 110. See Yusuf, 35 F.3d at 715 (explaining that “allegations of a procedurally 
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relating to a causal connection between the flawed outcome and 
gender bias.”111 The allegations must “go well beyond the surmises 
of the plaintiff as to what was in the minds of others and involve 
provable events that in the aggregate would allow a trier of fact to 
find that gender affected the outcome of the disciplinary 
proceeding.”112  
A selective enforcement claim under Title IX “asserts that, 
regardless of the student’s guilt or innocence, the severity of the 
penalty and/or the decision to initiate the proceeding was affected 
by the student’s gender.”113 To successfully bring a selective 
enforcement claim, a plaintiff must demonstrate that a 
similarly-situated member of the opposite sex was treated more 
favorably under the disciplinary proceedings due to gender.114 
These claims often prove difficult for male plaintiffs due to the lack 
of similarly-situated female perpetrators.115 Under a selective 
enforcement claim, a plaintiff must at least “demonstrate an 
inconsistency that warrants further inquiry.”116 
Under the theory of deliberate indifference, “educational 
institutions may be held liable for their deliberate indifference to 
 
or otherwise flawed proceeding that has led to an adverse and erroneous outcome 
combined with a conclusory allegation of gender discrimination is not sufficient” 
unless there are “particular circumstances relating to a causal connection 
between the flawed outcome and gender bias” alleged). 
 111. Id.  
 112. Id. at 716. 
 113. Id. at 715. 
 114. See Doe v. Ohio State Univ., 239 F. Supp. 3d 1048, 1067–68 (S.D. Ohio 
2017) (concluding that because the plaintiff could not identify a similarly-situated 
female accused of violating the University’s code of conduct and not being 
dismissed from the University, he had not sufficiently pled a claim for selective 
enforcement). 
 115. See, e.g., Doe v. Columbia Coll. Chi., 299 F. Supp. 3d 939, 958–59 (N.D. 
Ill. 2017) (rejecting plaintiff’s selective enforcement claim because of his 
conclusory statements and “especially in light of [his] allegation that ‘virtually all’ 
sexual assault complaints were lodged by females against males, which suggests 
that [the University] has not had the opportunity to refuse to discipline female 
students because of sexual assault”); Prasad v. Cornell Univ., 2016 WL 3212079, 
at *18 (N.D.N.Y. Feb. 24, 2016) (stating that the plaintiff “seemingly negates the 
possibility of establishing that female students were treated more favorably than 
males in similar circumstances” by alleging that the University had no reported 
incidents of male students submitting sexual assault or misconduct complaints 
against female students). 
 116. Yusuf v. Vassar Coll., 35 F.3d 709, 715 (2d Cir. 1994). 
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acts of peer sexual harassment where their lack of response to the 
harassment is “clearly unreasonable in light of the known 
circumstances.”117 To maintain a claim for deliberate indifference 
under Title IX and be able to hold a university responsible for 
sexual harassment, a plaintiff must demonstrate that a university 
official had actual notice of, and was deliberately indifferent to, the 
misconduct.118 A failure to follow Title IX regulations is not alone 
sufficient to allege sexual harassment under a deliberate 
indifference claim.119 A claim for deliberate indifference was 
designed for students alleging sexual harassment, which goes well 
beyond sexual discrimination under Title IX disciplinary 
proceedings—the behavior must constitute pervasive 
harassment.120  
Occasionally plaintiffs attempt to use an archaic-assumptions 
theory under Title IX, alleging that the university acted based on 
outdated, biased beliefs of gender dynamics.121 Plaintiffs assert 
that universities maintain a perception of women as victims and 
men as aggressors and therefore have an archaic assumption 
based in gender bias.122 Courts have refused thus far to apply the 
 
 117. Davis v. Monroe Cty. Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 648 (1999). 
 118. See Horner v. Ky. High Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 206 F.3d 685, 692–93 (6th 
Cir. 2000) (concluding that the relief under Title IX was only available when the 
policy is facially neutral if an intentional violation is shown, which requires actual 
notice of the harassment and deliberate indifference to it). 
 119. See Z.J. v. Vanderbilt Univ., 355 F. Supp. 3d 646, 675 (M.D. Tenn. 2018) 
(stating that the plaintiff’s deliberate indifference claim failed because the 
allegedly biased disciplinary process was not sufficient to support “pervasive and 
widespread harassment” that was actionable under Title IX (referencing 
Carmichael v. Galbraith, 574 F. App’x 286, 289–90 (5th Cir. 2014))). 
 120. See Doe v. Baum, 903 F.3d 575, 588 (6th Cir. 2018) (“[T]hough sexual 
harassment is a form of discrimination for purposes of Title IX, we have held that 
to plead a Title IX deliberate-indifference claim, ‘the misconduct alleged must be 
sexual harassment,’ not just a biased disciplinary process.” (quoting Doe v. Miami 
Univ., 882 F.3d 579, 591 (6th Cir. 2018))). 
 121. See id. at 587–88 (explaining that the archaic-assumptions theory has 
been used to “show that a school denied a student an equal opportunity to 
participate in an athletic program because of historical assumptions about boys’ 
and girls’ physical capabilities” (citing Mallory v. Ohio Univ., 76 F. App’x 643, 
638–39 (6th Cir. 2003))). 
 122. See Mallory, 76 Fed. App’x at 640 (describing the plaintiff’s 
archaic-assumptions allegations that the University held an attitude that “men 
cannot be violated,” which led to an assumption that the woman was the victim 
in this situation). 
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theory outside of the athletics context to a reverse Title IX claim 
arising out of sexual assault disciplinary proceedings.123  
Courts also have refused to apply the hostile-environment 
theory to reverse Title IX cases arising out of disciplinary 
proceedings. Under hostile-environment claims, plaintiffs allege 
that their educational experiences were severely altered by their 
universities’ discriminatory environments.124 Because the 
hostile-environment theory is based on sexual harassment rather 
than discrimination, plaintiffs must present “sex-specific language 
or conduct designed to humiliate, ridicule, intimidate, or insult,” 
which is typically more severe than the experience allegedly 
caused by discrimination in disciplinary proceedings.125  
Finally, a plaintiff can attempt to bring a reverse Title IX 
claim if he believes his university pursued action against him in a 
retaliatory manner.126 Under a claim of retaliatory action, the 
plaintiff must demonstrate the university’s, or university official’s, 
differential treatment of a complaint that the plaintiff in good faith 
believes to be gender-based harassment.127 Therefore, the male 
plaintiff must demonstrate that he has been sexually harassed by 
 
 123. See Baum, 903 F.3d at 588 (refusing the plaintiff’s request to extend the 
theory because that court had never applied it outside of the athletic context and 
did not see a reason to change course); Saravanan v. Drexel Univ., No. 17-3409, 
2017 WL 4532243, at *7 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 10, 2017) (stating that the standard applies 
“only in cases alleging that a public school entity has denied equal opportunities 
to participate in athletic programs based on unfounded and antiquated historical 
notions about the physical capabilities of girls and boys” (citing Doe v. Baum, 227 
F. Supp. 3d 784, 821 (E.D. Mich. 2017))). 
 124. See Vanderbilt, 355 F. Supp. 3d at 674 (“To sustain this claim, a plaintiff 
must allege, among other things, that his educational experience was ‘permeated 
with discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult that is sufficiently severe 
or pervasive [so as] to alter the conditions of the victim’s educational 
environment.’” (quoting Doe v. Miami Univ., 882 F.3d 579, 590 (6th Cir. 2018))). 
 125. Doe v. Salisbury Univ., 123 F. Supp. 3d 748, 765 (D. Md. 2015) (quoting 
Doe v. Salisbury Univ., 107 F. Supp. 3d 481, 487–90 (D. Md. 2015)). 
 126. See Jackson v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 544 U.S. 167, 173–74 (2005) 
(“Retaliation against a person because that person has complained of sex 
discrimination is another form of intentional sex discrimination encompassed by 
Title IX’s private cause of action. Retaliation is, by definition, an intentional act. 
It is a form of ‘discrimination’ because the complainant is being subjected to 
differential treatment.” (quoting 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (2018))). 
 127. See id. at 174 (concluding that when a university “retaliates against a 
person because he complains of sex discrimination, this constitutes intentional 
‘discrimination’ ‘on the basis of sex,’ in violation of Title IX”) (emphasis in 
original).  
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the action brought against him, which is factually different from 
most claims brought under reverse Title IX theories.128  
B. Pleading Standards and Motions to Dismiss 
The first hurdle for a plaintiff is to sufficiently state his claim 
against the defendant and survive the defendant’s motion to 
dismiss. In order to survive a 12(b)(6) motion129 in a reverse Title 
IX claim, a plaintiff must allege facts that create a plausible 
inference that the university engaged in sexual discrimination 
against him.130 The plaintiff’s complaint must contain enough 
factual content to allow the court to reasonably infer that the 
plaintiff would be entitled to relief if he proved everything in his 
complaint.131 There is significant case law exploring the pleading 
standards and causality requirements under Title IX claims.132  
Courts have reacted differently to the plausibility and 
pleading standards used in relation to Title IX reverse 
discrimination claims.133 One area in which courts differ is in their 
willingness to accept allegations that public criticism and outside 
pressure on universities demonstrate gender bias in the accused 
 
 128. See Salisbury, 123 F. Supp. 3d at 769–70 (noting that the plaintiff’s 
complaint regarding the minor discipline he received was “exactly the kind of 
petty slight or minor annoyance that does not constitute an adverse act” under 
retaliatory action).  
 129. See FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6) (setting forth that a party may assert the 
defense that the pleading party has failed to “state a claim upon which relief can 
be granted”).  
 130. See Corbin, supra note 4, at 2688–89 (evaluating the different judicial 
responses to reverse Title IX lawsuits under Twombly, Iqbal, and Swierkiewicz). 
 131. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678–79 (2009) (stating that while 
legal conclusions and naked assertions are not sufficient, the court may determine 
that facts taken as true and inferences drawn in favor of the plaintiff plausibly 
give rise to an entitlement to relief).  
 132. See, e.g., Doe v. Columbia Univ., 831 F.3d 46, 56–59 (2d Cir. 2016) 
(permitting an action to proceed against the University when the evaluator of the 
claim formed a conclusion against the weight of the evidence, which substantially 
favored the plaintiff/accused); Doe v. Cummins, 662 Fed. App’x 437, 452 (6th Cir. 
2016) (stating that the plaintiff had failed to create a reasonable inference that 
gender bias was the cause of the allegedly deficient proceedings against him). 
 133. See Corbin, supra note 4, at 2697–2702 (explaining that the majority of 
courts improperly dismiss reverse Title IX claims while a minority of courts 
permit the claims to proceed to the discovery phase).  
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students’ disciplinary proceedings.134 Some courts view these 
allegations as gender neutral or at most showing a bias favoring 
assault victims rather than favoring female students over male 
students.135 Other courts have determined that the external 
pressure on universities can give rise to a plausible explanation for 
gender bias.136 The legitimacy of the causal connection between the 
pressure upon the school and the alleged erroneous outcome or 
selective enforcement is not consistent across the courts and 
warrants further exploration and clarification.137 
 
 134. See, e.g., Ruff v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of N.M., 272 F. Supp. 3d 1289, 
1296–97 (D.N.M. 2017) (stating that male college students failed to allege facts 
demonstrating that outside pressure actually influenced the University’s pursuit 
of the sexual assault case in a gender-biased manner rather than because of the 
serious nature of the female student’s allegations); Rolph v. Hobart & William 
Smith Colls., 271 F. Supp. 3d 386, 396–405 (W.D.N.Y. 2017) (stating that the male 
student’s criminal charge of a sex crime did not negate the inference of the 
College’s gender bias, which the student plausibly pled stemmed from media 
criticism of the College causing it to take a stance disadvantaging the plaintiff as 
compared to the female complainant).  
 135. See, e.g., Doe v. Coll. of Wooster, 243 F. Supp. 3d 875, 886 (N.D. Ohio 
2017) (determining that public criticism of the College did not suggest an 
adequate basis for gender bias and that the fact that the College was seeking to 
comply with federal regulation was not an indication of gender bias); Doe v. Univ. 
of Colo., Boulder, 255 F. Supp. 3d 1064, 1078 (D. Colo. 2017) (“[P]ressure from the 
federal government to investigate sexual assault allegations more 
aggressively– either general pressure exerted by the Dear Colleague Letter or 
specific pressure exerted by an investigation directed at the University, or  
both—says nothing about the University’s alleged desire to find men responsible 
because they are men.”). 
 136. See, e.g., Doe v. Baum, 903 F.3d 575, 586 (6th Cir. 2018) (stating that all 
of the public attention and federal pressure alone is not enough to state a claim 
but rather “provides a backdrop that, when combined with other circumstantial 
evidence of bias in Doe’s specific proceeding, gives rise to a plausible claim”); Doe 
v. Miami Univ., 882 F.3d 579, 594 (6th Cir. 2018) (addressing allegations that 
“pressure from the government to combat vigorously sexual assault on college 
campuses and the severe potential punishment—loss of all federal funds—if it 
failed to comply, led Miami University to discriminate against men in its 
sexual-assault adjudication process”).  
 137. Compare Baum, 903 F.3d at 589 (Gilman, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part) (stating that the majority ruled in plaintiff’s favor despite his 
failure “to show how general pressure on the University’s administration to 
pursue and effectively address sexual-assault complaints” led the school to “take 
actions against him based on gender bias), with Columbia, 831 F.3d at 57 
(allowing plaintiff’s claim to proceed because it was “entirely plausible that the 
University’s decision-makers and its investigator were motivated to favor the 
accusing female over the accused male, so as to protect themselves and the 
University from accusations that they had failed to protect female students from 
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1. Yusuf Baseline Standard 
Yusuf v. Vassar138 was one of the first reverse Title IX claims 
to reach the appellate level and clearly establish a standard for 
pleading a reverse Title IX sex discrimination claim.139 The Second 
Circuit stated that facts linking alleged procedural failures to 
underlying gender bias are necessary because “[a]llegations of a 
procedurally or otherwise flawed proceeding that has led to an 
adverse and erroneous outcome combined with a conclusory 
allegation of gender discrimination is not sufficient to survive a 
motion to dismiss.”140 The court determined that causation 
sufficient to state a claim for Title IX discrimination can be shown 
by “statements by members of the disciplinary tribunal, 
statements by pertinent university officials, or patterns of 
decision-making that also tend to show the influence of gender.”141 
The court ruled that the male student’s allegations regarding the 
circumstances around his disciplinary proceedings demonstrated 
events that could “sufficiently put into question the correctness of 
the outcome of that proceeding.”142 The court determined that 
these facts taken with the allegations that male students were 
historically, systematically, and invariably found guilty 
established a causal connection that gender bias affected the 
outcome of his discipline.143 
 
sexual assault”).  
 138. 35 F.3d 709 (2d Cir. 1994).  
 139. See id. at 712–13 (discussing the male student’s claim against his private 
college alleging that his hearing was unfair when the College would not allow two 
of his witnesses to testify). 
 140. Id. at 715.  
 141. See id. at 715–16 (“The allegations in support of the Title IX claim do 
more than merely recite the pleader’s conclusion that the complained-of conduct 
was discriminatory. Instead, the complaint alleges events that, if proven, would 
support an inference of discrimination.”).  
 142. Id. at 716.  
 143. See id. (“The allegation that males invariably lose when charged with 
sexual harassment at Vassar provides a verifiable causal connection similar to 
the use of statistical evidence in an employment case.”). 
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2. Yusuf Applied at Motions to Dismiss 
In Doe v. Columbia University,144 the Second Circuit again 
examined a reverse Title IX claim against a university.145 The 
plaintiff alleged that criticism directed at the University for its 
poor handling of female students’ sexual assault complaints 
against male students146 and the fact that the University was 
cognizant of that criticism caused the University to act upon 
impermissible bias.147 The court stated that there was “nothing 
implausible or unreasonable about the Complaint’s suggested 
inference that the panel adopted a biased stance in favor of the 
accusing female and against the defending male varsity athlete in 
order to avoid further fanning the criticisms that Columbia turned 
a blind eye to such assaults.”148 The court concentrated on the 
individual investigator’s background149 and her significant 
influence over the proceedings against the plaintiff.150 The court 
 
 144. 31 F.3d 46 (2d Cir. 2016).  
 145. See id. at 53 (alleging that the University’s investigator was motivated 
by pro-female sex bias, attributable in part to a desire to refute criticisms of 
herself and of the University for their past handling of similar complaints, 
causing her to conduct “a sex-biased and deficient investigation that was hostile 
to his claim”). 
 146. See id. at 50–51 (explaining the criticism of the University among the 
students and student organizations as well as in the press for its previous 
leniency toward sexual assault allegations). For an example of some of the 
criticism of Columbia at the time, see Tara Palmeri, Columbia Drops Ball on Jock 
‘Rapist’ Probe: Students, N.Y. POST (Dec. 11, 2013, 6:43 AM), 
https://perma.cc/EJ2B-Y4WK (last visited Nov. 11, 2019) (quoting female 
students as saying “their cases are just one example of the school’s mishandling 
of sex complaints” and “demanding that Columbia release more information about 
its in-house probes on sex assaults”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review).   
 147. See Columbia Univ., 831 F.3d at 56 (describing the plaintiff’s allegations 
“that Columbia’s hearing panel (which erroneously imposed discipline on the 
Plaintiff), its Dean (who rejected his appeal), and its Title IX investigator (who 
influenced the panel and the Dean by her report and recommendation), were all 
motivated in those actions by pro-female, anti-male bias”).   
 148. Id. at 58.  
 149. See id. (explaining that the investigator “had suffered personal criticism 
in the student body for her role in prior cases in which the University was seen 
as not taking seriously the complaints of female students”).  
 150. See id. (illustrating that although she “was not the decision-maker, she 
allegedly had significant influence, perhaps even determinative influence, over 
the University’s decision”).  
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then concluded that the male student had stated a plausible claim 
that the decision was motivated by a “pro-female, anti-male bias,” 
which caused the University to reach an incorrect conclusion.151  
In Doe v. University of Chicago,152 an Illinois federal court 
evaluated a male student’s claim that his University discriminated 
against him because of his gender153 and encouraged 
discriminatory retaliatory action against him.154 While the court 
recognized as plausible the student’s allegation that the 
University’s administration had encouraged his accuser to file a 
retaliatory action against him because of gender bias,155 it did not 
accept his allegations that the University’s overall climate was 
biased against him or deliberately indifferent to sex-based 
harassment directed at him.156 Significantly, the court also noted, 
[T]he parties should bear in mind that the facts sufficient to 
survive a motion to dismiss may not be enough at a later stage 
of the case, especially after discovery. The Court expects that 
more specific details . . . will emerge in discovery. At this point, 
however the Court is not deciding whether John Doe is likely to 
win, only whether he has a story that holds together.157  
While many reverse Title IX claims are beginning to survive 
motions to dismiss, including when using public pressure as 
 
 151. See id. at 57 (stating that “it is entirely plausible that the University’s 
decision-makers and its investigator were motivated to favor the accusing female 
over the accused male, so as to protect themselves and the University from 
accusations that they had failed to protect female students from sexual assault”). 
 152. No. 16-C-08298, 2017 WL 4163960 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 20, 2017).  
 153. See id. at *4 (“John Doe’s gender discrimination claim boils down to a 
contention that he was treated adversely in the Title IX disciplinary process 
because he is male, and that Jane Doe, a female student, was treated better 
because she was female.”).  
 154. See id. at *9 (agreeing that the University official’s alleged conduct was 
“so inexplicable that there is room for a retaliatory inference in John Doe’s favor 
to explain” the official’s behavior).  
 155. See id. at *5 (“If [the investigator] intentionally encouraged Jane Doe to 
file a false complaint—that is, he knew or believed that her complaint was false 
and encouraged her to file it anyway—then it is plausible that [he] did so based 
on gender bias.”). 
 156. See id. at *7 (explaining that the female student’s actions, including a 
public accusation against the plaintiff and Title IX complaint accusing him of 
sexual misconduct, even if false, were not harassment because of sex and, 
therefore, could not be considered actionable sexual harassment (citing Mary M. 
v. N. Lawrence Cmty. Sch. Corp., 131 F.3d 1220, 1228 (7th Cir. 1997))).   
 157. Id. at *6 (citing Swanson v. Citibank, 614 F.3d 400, 404 (7th Cir. 2010)). 
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evidence of discriminatory intent, the Chicago court correctly 
acknowledged that the facts sufficient at this stage will likely not 
be enough to survive later stages of litigation. Therefore, reverse 
Title IX plaintiffs must be prepared to demonstrate specific details 
regarding the sexual discrimination against them. 
IV. Reverse Title IX and Summary Judgment 
Once a plaintiff’s claim survives a motion to dismiss, the cases 
often move to the discovery stage158 or the parties reach a 
settlement.159 Once past these stages, the university will likely 
next ask the court for a grant of summary judgment.160 
A. Summary Judgment Burdens and Burden Shifting 
A court may grant summary judgment if the moving party 
shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact that 
must be decided by a fact-finder, so that the moving party is 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.161 A party asserting that 
there is no genuine dispute must support the assertion by showing 
that the non-moving party cannot produce any admissible evidence 
to support the facts necessary to its claim.162 To successfully oppose 
a motion for summary judgment, the non-moving party bears the 
burden of demonstrating that a genuine issue of fact exists as to 
 
 158. See John H. Beisner, Discovering a Better Way: The Need for Effective 
Civil Litigation Reform, 60 DUKE L.J. 547, 549 (2010) (explaining that discovery 
can “comprise between 50 percent and 90 percent of total litigation costs” in a 
case).  
 159. See infra note 178 and accompanying text. 
 160. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986) (opining that the 
rules of evidence “mandate[] the entry of summary judgment, after adequate time 
for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing 
sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s case”).  
 161. FED. R. CIV. P. 56; see, e.g., Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 
247 (1986) (explaining that a material fact is any specific fact that might affect 
the lawsuit’s outcome under the relevant law). 
 162. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323 (explaining that the party should inform “the 
district court of the basis for its motion, and identify[] those portions of ‘the 
pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, 
together with the affidavits, if any,’ which it believes demonstrate the absence of 
a genuine issue of material fact”). 
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an essential element of the case.163 The party opposing summary 
judgment must do “more than simply show that there is some 
metaphysical doubt as to material facts.”164 The court at this stage 
should review all evidence in the record and “draw all reasonable 
inferences in favor of the nonmoving party,” but the court “may not 
make credibility determinations or weigh the evidence.”165 
In McDonnell Douglas Corporation v. Green,166 the Supreme 
Court evaluated a claim under the Civil Rights Act of 1964167 in 
which an employment applicant alleged that he had been unfairly 
rejected based on his race for a position for which he was 
qualified.168 The Court addressed the “notable lack of harmony” 
that existed regarding the “applicable rules as to burden of proof 
and how this shifts upon the making of a prima facie case” of 
employment discrimination under Title VII.169 In describing the 
complainant’s initial burden to establish a prima facie case of 
racial discrimination in a Title VII trial, the Court explained, 
This may be done by showing (i) that he belongs to a racial 
minority; (ii) that he applied and was qualified for a job for 
which the employer was seeking applicants; (iii) that, despite 
his qualifications, he was rejected; and (iv) that, after his 
rejection, the position remained open and the employer 
continued to seek applicants from persons of complainant’s 
qualifications.170 
The Court determined that once the plaintiff has established 
the prima facie case, the “burden then must shift to the employer 
to articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the 
 
 163. See id. at 321–22 (stating that to oppose a motion for summary judgment, 
the non-moving party cannot rest on mere allegations).  
 164. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 
(1986).  
 165. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prod., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 150 (2000).  
 166. 411 U.S. 792 (1973).  
 167. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2018).  
 168. See McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 801 (stating that the plaintiff 
respondent charged that he was denied employment because of his race and his 
involvement in civil rights activities, which was supported by the fact that 
petitioner “sought mechanics, respondent’s trade, and continued to do so after 
respondent’s rejection” despite acknowledging his past satisfactory work 
performance).  
 169. Id. at 801.  
 170. Id. at 802.  
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employee’s rejection.”171 If the defendant employer succeeds in 
demonstrating a reason, the plaintiff is given the opportunity to 
show that the reason is actually pretextual in nature, meant to 
disguise racial discrimination.172 The Court also elaborated on 
certain evidence that would be relevant to a showing of pretext, 
such as statistics regarding the employer’s general discrimination 
against African American employees and evidence that white 
employees involved in similar acts were treated more favorably by 
the employer.173  
The McDonnell Douglas framework allows plaintiffs alleging 
discrimination a temporary presumption of the defendant’s 
discriminatory motive in order to avoid the obstacle of only being 
able to produce circumstantial, conclusory evidence.174 Since the 
Supreme Court’s decision in 1973, courts have applied the 
McDonnell Douglas framework in various analogous 
discrimination situations,175 including Title IX cases.176 The 
 
 171. Id.  
 172. See id. at 805 (ruling that the plaintiff respondent “must be given a full 
and fair opportunity to demonstrate by competent evidence that the 
presumptively valid reasons for his rejection were in fact a coverup for a racially 
discriminatory decision”).   
 173. See id. at 804 (stating that the employer “may justifiably refuse to rehire 
one who was engaged in unlawful, disruptive acts against it, but only if this 
criterion is applied alike to members of all race”).  
 174. See Doe v. Columbia Univ., 831 F.3d 46, 54 (2d Cir. 2016) (stating that 
“until the defendant furnishes a nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse action 
it took against the plaintiff, the plaintiff needs to present only minimal evidence 
supporting an inference of discrimination in order to prevail”).  
 175. See, e.g., Janczak v. Tulsa Winch, Inc., 621 Fed. App’x 528, 534–35 (10th 
Cir. 2015) (applying the burden shifting framework when an employee was 
terminated while on Family and Medical Leave Act leave and determining the 
employee sufficiently made out a prima facie retaliation claim but the employer 
demonstrated a legitimate, non-retaliatory reason for the action); Moore v. City 
of Charlotte, 754 F.2d 1100, 1105 (4th Cir. 1993) (allowing plaintiff to create a 
presumption of racially discriminatory intent when employer disciplined him 
more severely than other employees who engaged in similar conduct but were not 
members of his protected class); Lovelace v. Sherwin-Williams Co., 681 F.2d 230, 
239 (4th Cir. 1982) (applying the McDonnell Douglas framework to an allegedly 
discriminatory discharge of an employee by requiring the plaintiff to meet the 
initial burden of demonstrating that the employee hired someone else to do the 
same work despite the fact that he performed at the level of the employer’s 
expectations). 
 176. See Columbia, 831 F.3d at 55–56 (“Yusuf made clear that Title VII cases 
provide the proper framework for analyzing Title IX discrimination claims. We 
therefore hold that the temporary presumption afforded to plaintiffs in 
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framework serves as a tool for plaintiffs who can typically only 
point to circumstantial evidence of discriminatory intent. 
B. Cases Reaching Summary Judgment 
Not many reverse Title IX cases have reached or passed the 
summary judgment stage.177 The majority of these cases are either 
dismissed for failure to state a claim or subsequently settled after 
the court denies a motion to dismiss and allows the claim to move 
to discovery.178 However, a few circuit courts and several district 
courts have heard reverse Title IX claims on motions for summary 
judgment and have consistently ruled against the accused 
plaintiffs in favor of the universities.  
1. First Circuit 
Recently, the First Circuit reviewed a trial court’s decision to 
grant summary judgment of Title IX claims against Boston 
College.179 The court affirmed summary judgment for the 
defendants on the plaintiffs’ Title IX claims under erroneous 
outcome.180 The parties agreed that the applicable standard for the 
 
employment discrimination cases under Title VII applies to sex discrimination 
plaintiffs under Title IX as well.”); see also Papelino v. Albany Coll. of Pharmacy 
of Union Univ., 633 F.3d 81, 89 (2d Cir. 2011) (stating that in some respects, “a 
Title IX sex discrimination claim requires the same kind of proof required in a 
Title VII sex discrimination claim” (citing Torres v. Pisano, 116 F.3d 625, 630 n.3 
(2d Cir. 1997))). 
 177. See Buzuvis, supra note 8, at 91–93 (stating that “there are far fewer 
summary judgment decisions evaluating plaintiffs’ evidentiary support for 
erroneous outcome claims than opinions deciding motions to dismiss claims for 
insufficient pleading” and that “no selective enforcement claims have yet survived 
motions for summary judgment”). 
 178. See id. at 85–86 (explaining that “many university defendants have 
prevailed on motions to dismiss the plaintiff’s claim for insufficient pleading, 
though courts have permitted disciplined-student plaintiffs’ Title IX claims to 
proceed to the discovery phase” which positions the student in a good position to 
procure a settlement from the university (referencing Wells v. Xavier Univ., 7 F. 
Supp. 3d 746 (S.D. Ohio 2014))).  
 179. Doe v. Trs. of Boston Coll., 892 F.3d 67 (1st Cir. 2018). 
 180. See id. at 90–93 (explaining the plaintiffs’ deliberate indifference claim 
but focusing on the erroneous outcome standard because the deliberate 
indifference claim relied on the underlying acts of discrimination under the 
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erroneous outcome claim required the plaintiffs “offer evidence 
‘cast[ing] some articulable doubt on the accuracy of the outcome of 
the proceeding,’ and indicating that ‘gender bias was a motivating 
factor.’”181 The plaintiffs argued that the record contained 
“sufficient evidence to support their erroneous outcome claim that 
[the college]’s procedures were infected with gender bias.”182 They 
contended that the college’s “pervasive belief” that perpetrators 
are always male and accusers always female was evidenced in its 
written policies and procedures.183 The plaintiffs also maintained 
that the disciplinary proceedings were impacted by gender bias 
arising from outside pressure against the college and evidenced by 
a “pattern of decision-making” motivated by gender bias against 
the accused plaintiff.184  
The First Circuit determined that the plaintiffs failed on the 
second Yusuf prong—that gender was a motivating factor in the 
accuracy of the outcome—by only putting forth “superficial 
assertions of discrimination.”185 In ruling against the plaintiffs, the 
court emphasized that “[c]onclusory allegations are not enough” to 
survive a motion for summary judgment186 and determined that 
the plaintiffs’ argument that the college’s “administrators were 
influenced by outside pressure, in particular the U.S. Department 
of Education’s April 2011 ‘Dear Colleague’ Letter” was “both 
conclusory and meritless.”187 Accordingly, the court ruled that the 
 
erroneous outcome claim (citing City of Los Angeles v. Heller, 475 U.S. 796, 799 
(1986) (per curiam))).  
 181. Id. at 90 (quoting Yusuf v. Vassar Coll., 35 F.3d 709, 715 (2d Cir. 1994)).  
 182. Id. at 90–91.  
 183. See id. (describing the plaintiffs’ allegations that the College’s bias was 
“confirmed by the terminology [it] employs in its written policies and procedures: 
accusers are branded ‘victims’ or ‘victims/survivors,’ while an accused student is 
labeled a ‘perpetrator’”).  
 184. See id. at 91 (noting that the plaintiffs cited several occurrences of college 
administrators’ treatment of the accused, as well as the fact that the criminal 
charges against him were dismissed, evidencing his supposed innocence).  
 185. Id. at 91–92. 
 186. Id. at 92.  
 187. See id. (“The Does have not explained how the Dear Colleague Letter 
reflects or espouses gender bias. This necessarily dooms their argument that the 
Letter somehow infected the proceedings at issue here with gender bias. More 
than ‘conclusory allegations, improbable inferences, and unsupported 
speculation’ is required to defeat summary judgment.” (citing LeBlanc v. Great 
Am. Ins. Co., 6 F.3d 836, 842 (1st Cir. 1993))). 
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plaintiffs did not meet the standard for challenging the college’s 
sexual assault disciplinary procedures.188 
In 2017, a federal district court in New York evaluated a 
reverse Title IX claim against Colgate University.189 The plaintiff 
in Colgate had been accused by three females of similar incidents 
of sexual misconduct.190 After he was expelled from the University, 
he brought an erroneous outcome challenge,191 alleging that his 
expulsion was based on gender bias against him.192 The court 
addressed each of the plaintiff’s arguments individually and 
concluded that he failed to provide “sufficient evidence that gender 
bias motivated Colgate’s decision to expel him.”193 
The plaintiff alleged that the panel’s training was 
gender-biased, the panel itself suffered from bias, the investigation 
was biased because the investigator once worked at a sheriff’s 
office, and the hearing was procedurally unfair.194 The plaintiff 
also cited the University’s “sexual climate,” including student 
activism and federal influence,195 at the time of the incident as 
evidence of the pressure “that caused Plaintiff’s proceeding to be 
tainted by gender bias.”196 The court compared the plaintiff’s 
assertions to those in Columbia, but explained that the parties had 
“reached the summary judgment stage and [Plaintiff] must 
 
 188. See id. (“As this case comes to us on a motion for summary judgment, 
after the parties have engaged in substantial discovery, a complete lack of 
evidence—whether direct or circumstantial—will not allow a party to survive a 
motion for summary judgment.”).  
 189. Doe v. Colgate Univ., No. 5:15-CV-1069 (LEK/DEP), 2017 WL 4990629 
(N.D.N.Y. Oct. 31, 2017).  
 190. See id. at *2–5 (describing the three alleged instances of sexual 
misconduct and the investigation and hearings that followed).  
 191. For a discussion of the plaintiff’s other claims under New York state law, 
including theories of breach of contract, breach of the covenant of good faith and 
fair dealing, and equitable estoppel, see id. at *18–25.  
 192. See id. at *11 (describing the requirements for an erroneous outcome 
claim under Yusuf and Columbia).  
 193. Id.  
 194. See id. at *14–18 (addressing and rejecting each of plaintiff’s allegations). 
 195. See infra notes 198–201 and accompanying text (elaborating on the 
sources the plaintiff pointed to as examples of influences on the disciplinary 
process).  
 196. Colgate, 2017 WL 4990629, at *12.  
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demonstrate a genuine issue of material fact, not merely 
allegations of a plausible inference of gender bias.”197  
First, the plaintiff pointed to student activism on campus, 
including the 2014 Sexual Climate Forum,198 and general survivor 
support on campus, including a student group called “Breaking the 
Silence.”199 The court found no evidence of bias against men due to 
either example of student activism. Next, the plaintiff pointed to 
the 2011 DCL as pressure on the University to erroneously 
discipline men, but the court explained that “Colgate’s effort to 
comply with the 2011 DCL, standing alone, is not evidence of 
gender bias.”200 The plaintiff cited university officials’ statements 
regarding sexual assault to demonstrate pressure put on the 
hearing panel, but the court was again unconvinced.201 Overall, the 
court did not find the plaintiff’s evidence sufficient “to permit a 
reasonable jury to find that Colgate faced pressure that caused 
gender bias to infect” the plaintiff’s hearing.202 The court observed 
that all the alleged procedural flaws to which the plaintiff pointed 
were “a combination of unsubstantiated assertions based on 
plaintiff’s subjective impressions at the hearing,” and accordingly 
the court granted the University’s motion for summary 
judgment.203 
 
 197. Id. (quoting Doe v. Trs. of Boston Coll., No. 15-cv-10790, 2016 WL 
5799297, at *25 n.7) (alteration in original). 
 198. See id. (observing that plaintiff’s statements revolving around the forum 
and statements made in relation to the forum and its speaker often 
mischaracterize the record).  
 199. See id. (“[T]he only evidence regarding Breaking the Silence suggests 
that it sought to raise awareness of sexual assault at Colgate, making no 
distinction between male and female victims . . . . [R]aising awareness of sexual 
assault, without drawing gendered assumptions about males, does not raise an 
inference of anti-male bias.”).   
 200. Id. at *13. 
 201. See id. (stating that one official’s indication to parents that the 
University had expelled students found responsible for sexual misconduct did not 
indicate a promise of future punishment and that another official’s statements 
regarding “a world without rape” did not demonstrate an impact on the University 
or pressure on its administrators). 
 202. Id.  
 203. Id. at *17.  
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2. Sixth Circuit 
The Sixth Circuit has seen more of these reverse Title IX cases 
than other circuits to date.204 The Sixth Circuit reviewed a grant 
of summary judgment of a student’s federal claim for sexual 
discrimination under Title IX in Mallory v. Ohio University.205 The 
plaintiff was a male student who was found culpable and expelled 
by the University for sexual misconduct after an incident involving 
his sexual encounter with a female student.206 Along with state law 
defamation claims against witnesses in the proceedings,207 the 
plaintiff alleged that the University discriminated against him 
under Title IX “by initiating a disciplinary proceeding against him 
and concluding that he committed sexual assault under the 
University’s code of student conduct.”208  
Because the Supreme Court and the Sixth Circuit had not “set 
forth a standard for determining when intentional discrimination 
has occurred in a case where a student has relied on Title IX to 
challenge either the initiation or the outcome of the disciplinary 
proceeding,” the court followed the analytical framework provided 
in Yusuf.209 Under the Yusuf framework, the Sixth Circuit affirmed 
the district court’s determination that the plaintiff had “failed to 
present a genuine issue of material fact regarding his selective 
 
 204. See generally Doe v. Baum, 903 F.3d 575 (6th Cir. 2018); Doe v. Miami 
Univ., 882 F.3d 579 (6th Cir. 2018); Doe v. Cummins, 662 Fed. App’x 437, 452 
(6th Cir. 2016). 
 205. 76 Fed. App’x 634 (6th Cir. 2003).  
 206. See id. at 636–37 (describing the situation leading to the plaintiff’s 
expulsion, as well as a charge of felony battery, in which several people witnessed 
the plaintiff engaging in sexual activity with a severely intoxicated female while 
the plaintiff had also been consuming alcohol). 
 207. See id. at 637 (summarizing plaintiff’s claims against several students 
for statements they made in connection with the incident but noting that the court 
dismissed the claims for various reasons and plaintiff was not appealing these 
dismissals).  
 208. See id. at 636–37 (noting that the University board’s rationale for the 
plaintiff’s guilt came from the victim’s significant impairment, preventing her 
from being able to engage in consensual contact with the plaintiff).  
 209. See id. at 638 (explaining that the Second Circuit in Yusuf analogized 
Title IX claims to Title VII law and required a plaintiff to demonstrate that the 
University’s conduct was motivated by sexual bias).  
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enforcement claims under Title IX under either an erroneous 
result or selective enforcement theory.”210  
Under the plaintiff’s claim for erroneous outcome,211 he argued 
that the University had improper focus in the investigation, 
leading to an incorrect result.212 The plaintiff claimed that the 
University’s focus revealed that it held “an antiquated notion that 
‘men are sexual aggressors and women are victims,’”213 but the 
court concluded that “the University’s decision to focus on the 
ability to consent merely demonstrates the University’s policy 
decision to punish those who engage in sexual conduct with 
another person when the first person is aware of the other’s 
inability to consent.”214 Finally, the plaintiff pointed to 
discrimination against him as evidenced by the allegedly 
prejudicial procedures which resulted in the erroneous outcome.215 
The court found that the plaintiff had not demonstrated a pattern 
of biased decision-making by the University or by a university 
official with allegedly biased views.216  
The court also rejected the plaintiff’s argument for selective 
enforcement,217 which was based on another allegation of archaic 
 
 210. See id. at 642 (confirming that the district court properly granted 
summary judgment in favor of the University). 
 211. See id. (describing the plaintiff’s argument under erroneous outcome as 
attempting to point to prejudicial deficiencies in the proceedings).  
 212. See id. at 639 (explaining the plaintiff’s argument that “the hearing 
panel’s focus upon whether [the victim] was able to consent supports finding an 
erroneous outcome here because the University’s definition of sexual assault does 
not extend to situations where the offender merely knows that the other person’s 
ability to consent is impaired”).  
 213. Id. 
 214. See id. (stating that even if the University erroneously interpreted the 
Student’s Code’s language regarding consent, the plaintiff presented “no evidence 
that this interpretation was discriminatorily applied or motivated by a 
chauvinistic view of the sexes”).  
 215. See id. (enumerating plaintiff’s claims regarding his lack of legal counsel, 
the process for cross-examination, and the scheduling of the hearing during the 
pendency of criminal charges against him). 
 216. See id. at 639–40 (referencing the plaintiff’s reliance on a previous 
complaint against the university official but stating that without evidence of other 
students accused of and disciplined for sexual assault and without indication that 
the official attempted to wrongfully steer the result, there was no genuine issue 
of material fact).  
 217. See id. at 640 (“The focal point of this argument is that the incident 
report equally implicated both him and [the victim] because they were both 
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assumptions by the University about the identity of the 
aggressor.218 The court found that the plaintiff could not 
demonstrate that the female victim was in a sufficiently similar 
situation because he ignored critical facts of the incident which 
differentiated the two.219 Accordingly, the court decided that the 
plaintiff failed to point to a sufficiently similarly-situated female 
and had not presented a genuine issue of material fact under the 
selective enforcement claim.220 Finally, the court found no support 
for the plaintiff’s argument on appeal regarding the University’s 
deliberate indifference.221 Overall, the court held that the plaintiff 
had not “presented a genuine issue of material fact with regard to 
whether the University, in its initiation and prosecution of the 
disciplinary action, excluded [him] because of his sex”222 and 
granted the University’s motion for summary judgment. 
3. Title IX and McDonnell Douglas 
In 1996, the Eastern District of Virginia evaluated a Title IX 
suit against a university at the summary judgment stage and 
applied the McDonnell Douglas burden shifting framework in 
Haley v. Virginia Commonwealth University.223 The case’s facts 
differed from cases previously discussed in a few respects,224 but 
 
intoxicated while having sex. These circumstances, [plaintiff] argues, presented 
a fair question about ‘who assaulted whom.’”).  
 218. See id. (pointing to the plaintiff’s argument that the University possessed 
an attitude that men could not be violated). 
 219. See id. at 640–41 (explaining that the plaintiff’s argument ignores the 
fact that he was sufficiently more aware than the victim, “which was not based 
on the different sexes of the individuals . . . and does nothing to establish that the 
University’s initiation of an investigation against Mallory was motivated by sex”). 
 220. See id. at 641 (distinguishing the plaintiff’s evidence regarding an 
affidavit in a previous case and affirming the district court’s grant of summary 
judgment on the selective enforcement claim). 
 221. Regarding the deliberate indifference argument, as well as plaintiff’s 
argument for an archaic-assumptions standard, the court explains that the 
plaintiff asks the court on appeal to read the standards into the Yusuf framework, 
but the court does not elaborate further on plaintiff’s specific allegations under 
those theories. Id. at 638.  
 222. Id.  
 223. 948 F. Supp. 573 (E.D. Va. 1996). 
 224. See id. at 575–76 (discussing at length the underlying facts between the 
male plaintiff, a graduate student and employee of the University, and the female 
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the claim under the Title IX claim of gender bias fell under the 
Yusuf framework.225 The court determined that despite the 
plaintiff properly setting forth a claim for relief under Title IX, “the 
pleadings, affidavits, transcripts, and other evidence” showed that 
there was no genuine issue of material fact as to the Title IX claim 
and granted the University judgment as a matter of law.226 
The court stated that “the substantive elements of a federal 
discrimination claim are (1) that the plaintiff is a member of a 
protected class, (2) that the plaintiff suffered an unfavorable 
action, and (3) that but for the plaintiff’s membership in the 
protected class, the adverse action would not have been made.”227 
The third element “requires proof of discriminatory intent.”228 The 
court determined that the record established no direct or indirect 
evidence of a discriminatory intent229 and that there was also not 
sufficient evidence to create a presumption of such an intent under 
the McDonnell Douglas framework.230 The court explained that, 
while courts must necessarily alter the exact terms of McDonnell 
Douglas outside of the hiring context, “the basic requirement 
remains the same: the plaintiff, in order to create a presumption 
of illegal discrimination and shift the burden to the defendant, 
must show that he has been treated differently from 
similarly-situated people outside of the protected class.”231  
The court summarized the Fourth Circuit’s adaption of the 
McDonnell Douglas framework in two analogous cases—Lovelace 
 
complainant, a fellow student and employee, who accused him of sexual 
harassment, after which he was excluded from the school for two years).  
 225. See id. at 578 (citing Yusuf as instructive because Title IX, which 
prohibits sex discrimination in education, has been interpreted by looking at Title 
VI and VII case law).  
 226. Id.  
 227. Id.  
 228. Id.  
 229. See id. (stating that the plaintiff seemed to have “a fundamental 
misunderstanding of what it takes to prove a discrimination claim” because his 
allegations “at best reflect[ed] a bias against people accused of sexual harassment 
and in favor of victims and indicate[d] nothing about gender discrimination”).  
 230. See id. at 579 (“In discrimination cases analogous to [plaintiff’s], where 
there is no direct proof of an illegal bias, the plaintiff can still survive a properly 
instituted motion for summary judgment by taking advantage of the McDonnell 
scheme of burdens and rebuttable presumptions.”). 
 231. Id. at 580.  
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v. Sherwin-Williams Co.232 and Moore v. City of Charlotte233—and 
analyzed the plaintiff’s claim under each.234 In Lovelace, the court 
adapted the framework to a case alleging discriminatory discharge 
from employment, allowing the plaintiff to “shift the initial burden 
by showing that he was performing at a level that met employer’s 
legitimate expectations and that the employer sought someone else 
to do the same work.”235 The Haley court described the plaintiff’s 
first option for classification of his allegations under McDonnell 
Douglas as an allegation under Lovelace that it was 
“discriminatory to separate him from the school.”236 The Haley 
court determined this claim would fail for two reasons. First, 
because the plaintiff was found to have harassed the female 
complainant, he would not be able to “show that he was performing 
at a level that met his employer’s or his educational institution’s 
legitimate expectations, and thus cannot shift the burden to [the 
University] to adduce a non-discriminatory reason for his 
separation from the university.”237 Even if the plaintiff could shift 
the burden, the court determined that the University produced a 
non-discriminatory rationale for its suspension of the 
plaintiff— his sexual harassment of the accuser—and he had not 
demonstrated this rationale was pretextual.238 The court reasoned 
that while “the plaintiff need not present new evidence at this 
stage of the analysis, the evidence presented” by the plaintiff did 
“not meet the heightened level of specificity called for by 
Lovelace.”239  
The Haley court next explored the Moore adaptation of the 
burden shifting scheme in a claim alleging race discrimination in 
 
 232. 681 F.2d 230 (4th Cir. 1982). 
 233. 754 F.2d 1100 (4th Cir. 1985). 
 234. See Haley v. Va. Commonwealth Univ., 948 F. Supp. 573, 580 (E.D. Va. 
1996) (“In the case at bar, there are two ways to frame Haley’s allegations, but 
neither suffices under the McDonnell scheme as adapted in analogous cases.”).  
 235. Id. (citing Lovelace, 681 F.2d at 239).  
 236. Id.  
 237. Id.  
 238. See id. (explaining that the University’s legitimate, non-discriminatory 
rationale would shift the burden, and the plaintiff “had adduced no evidence 
whatsoever” that the rationale was pretextual).   
 239. Id.  
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the enforcement of employee disciplinary measures.240 In Moore, 
the plaintiff “could create the presumption of discriminatory intent 
through a showing that the prohibited conduct he engaged in was 
similar to that engaged in by employees outside of the protected 
class and that he received more severe disciplinary measures than 
those others.”241 The Haley court explained that the plaintiff’s 
claim could be viewed under Moore as an allegation that he was 
discriminated against in the way the disciplinary proceedings were 
held, making his initial burden that of showing female students 
accused of similarly prohibited conduct were disciplined less 
severely.242 This allegation, however, did not survive summary 
judgment because all of the plaintiff’s evidence pertained only to 
his own proceedings with no evidence about how other students 
similarly accused were treated by the University.243 In conclusion, 
the court held that the plaintiff could not set forth a prima facie 
case of sexual discrimination, or in the alternative, demonstrate 
that the University’s reasons for its disciplinary action were 
pretextual, making summary judgment for the University 
appropriate.244  
Few other cases have reached the summary judgment stage in 
reverse Title IX claims,245 making the future of the claims unclear.  
 
 240. Id. 
 241. Id. (referencing Moore, 754 F.2d at 1105–06); see also Evans v. Techs. 
Applications & Serv. Co., 80 F.3d 954, 960 (4th Cir. 1996) (applying the 
McDonnell Douglas framework to a claim of gender discrimination in employer’s 
promotion of employees). 
 242. See Haley, 948 F. Supp. at 580–81 (explaining that this allegation could 
also be supported “by data showing that women rarely, if ever, are accused of 
sexual harassment, coupled perhaps with evidence that women accused of other 
[university] rules violations are treated differently than men are”).  
 243. See id. at 581 (noting that the plaintiff presented “absolutely no evidence 
about how other students are treated” in the University’s disciplinary 
proceedings). 
 244. See id. at 583 (“[T]he record establishes that there is no direct or indirect 
evidence or [sic] discriminatory intent, nor is there sufficient evidence to establish 
a presumption of such intent under the McDonnell framework and its various 
adaptations.”).  
 245. See, e.g., Bleiler v. Coll. of the Holy Cross, No. CIV.A. 11-11541-DJC, 
2013 WL 4714340, at *7 (D. Mass. Aug. 26, 2013) (holding that the male student 
had failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the college acted 
with gender bias in its proceedings because no reasonable jury could find that the 
College’s code of conduct was gender biased). 
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V. Argument 
The rival interests involved in campus sexual misconduct 
cases are evidenced in the polarized debate that surrounds the 
issue. Despite some similarities shared on each side of the 
conversation, the differences rule the day.246 The conflicting 
guidance put forth by the Department of Education in recent years 
verifies the opposing priorities of the competing factions—while 
the Obama administration, specifically through the 2011 DCL, 
generally sought to strengthen victim protections,247 the Trump 
administration’s 2017 DCL and subsequent proposed regulations 
highlight the importance of protections for the accused students.248 
This tension seems unlikely to resolve itself in the near future, 
increasing the chances that the types of claims discussed will 
continue to increase in frequency. Unfortunately, “[l]ower courts 
appear divided in whether allegations of a reverse gender backlash 
from the 2011 DCL and DOE’s enforcement thereof are sufficient, 
standing alone, to plead Title IX gender bias.”249  
The courts need to provide clarity regarding their acceptance 
of both federal and public pressure as evidence supporting an 
inference of gender bias. As more cases are surviving motions to 
dismiss, inevitably the amount of cases reaching the summary 
judgment stage will increase as well. Therefore, it is necessary to 
establish a consistent and clear framework for evaluating a 
plaintiff’s evidence that a genuine issue of material fact exists.  
 
 246. See Brodsky, supra note 6, at 827–31 (exploring the shared values 
between the warring interests and asserting that “the long-term realization of 
accused and victimized students’ interests depends on the perceived legitimacy of 
disciplinary procedures for gender violence”).  
 247. See 2011 DCL, supra note 41 (emphasizing that “schools should ensure 
that steps taken to accord due process rights to the alleged perpetrator do not 
restrict or unnecessarily delay the Title IX protections for the complainant”).  
 248. See 2017 Press Release, supra note 43 (announcing the end of “the era of 
rule by letter,” which “created a system that lacked basic elements of due process 
and failed to ensure fundamental fairness”).  
 249. Neal v. Colo. St. Univ.-Pueblo, No. 16-cv-873-RM-CBS, 2017 WL 633045, 
at *11 (D. Colo. Feb. 16, 2017).  
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A. Limiting Courts’ Consideration of Pressure on Universities 
It is common for reverse Title IX plaintiffs to cite pressure on 
universities as evidence of an incentive for the universities to be 
biased against them, and many plaintiffs cite Columbia as support 
for the assertion that public criticism of universities can be used to 
plead a reverse Title IX claim.250 However, Columbia should be 
narrowly limited to its particular set of facts, including 
particularized allegations against individual university officials in 
connection with the proceedings.251 Columbia does not support the 
broad assertion that pressure to address sexual assault indicates 
gender bias; at most, such criticism supports the proposition that 
universities are persuaded to favor victims.252 Without 
significantly more evidence of motivation by gender bias, courts 
should not give weight to pressure on universities as support for 
discriminatory intent—at most the combination of federal pressure 
and public criticism should provide a backdrop against which to 
assess the allegations of gender bias.253  
Furthermore, pressure is being put on universities from both 
sides, as evidenced by the intensely debated issues surrounding 
campus sexual assault policies. The public pressure by students 
and advocates must be considered in the overall context of the 
campus sexual assault debate, which includes arguments by critics 
concerned that “women will ‘cry rape’ and men will be unfairly 
 
 250. See, e.g., Doe v. Colgate Univ., No. 5:15-CV-1069 (LEK/DEP), 2017 WL 
4990629 (N.D.N.Y. Oct. 31, 2017) (analyzing a plaintiff’s claim using the 2011 
DCL and Columbia for evidence that the University had pressure to be biased 
against him). 
 251. See supra notes 145–153 and accompanying text (enumerating the 
plaintiff’s many examples of bias by individuals involved in the plaintiff’s 
investigation and hearing). The court in Columbia stated that the “alleged biased 
attitudes were, at least in part, adopted to refute criticisms circulating in the 
student body and in the public press that Columbia was turning a blind eye to 
female students’ charges of sexual assault by male students.” Doe v. Columbia 
Univ., 831 F.3d 46, 56 (2d Cir. 1996). 
 252. See, e.g., Austin v. Univ. of Or., 205 F. Supp. 3d 1214, 1226 (D. Or. 2016) 
(refusing “to extend [Columbia’s] reasoning because Plaintiffs make no similar 
allegations of an atmosphere of scrutiny, and even had they done so, there 
remains no plausible inference that a university’s aggressive response to 
allegations of sexual misconduct is evidence of gender discrimination”). 
 253. See Doe v. Baum, 903 F.3d 575, 586 (6th Cir. 2018) (utilizing the 
“backdrop” strategy to analyze the plaintiff’s claim).  
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punished.”254 There are many “loud[] voices decrying the treatment 
of students accused of gender violence” who “appear deeply 
unconcerned with victims’ educations” and have “rooted their 
campaign in misogyny and misinformation about sexual 
assault.”255 Some scholars argue that “[f]iling suit under Title IX is 
a political declaration that male rights matter . . . .”256 Therefore, 
courts should examine the overall public pressure put on 
universities as a broader backdrop against which to assess 
allegations of gender discrimination.  
B. Policies and Purposes of Title IX 
A large majority of the claims being brought under reverse 
Title IX theories are essentially at odds with the purposes of Title 
IX and of the sex discrimination theories of liability. Broadly 
speaking, university Title IX policies aim to increase awareness of 
sexual assault, protect the victims of such conduct, and adequately 
address such issues.257 It is an unreasonable inference that by 
creating and acting under policies with such goals, a university is 
biased against men or individual plaintiffs. The purpose of Title IX 
was not only to prevent federal funding from supporting 
discriminatory practices based on gender but also to provide 
individual protection to citizens against such discrimination.258  
Allowing federal pressure on universities to support a claim of 
reverse Title IX gender discrimination is contrary to the 
underlying explanations of the causes of action pursued. The 
concepts of deliberate indifference, hostile environment, 
 
 254. See Rosenfeld, supra note 11, at 368 (arguing that these critics should 
not minimize the aftereffects for women alleging sexual assault, including PTSD 
and emotional fallout from the assault itself).   
 255. Brodsky, supra note 6, at 826.  
 256. Corbin, supra note 4, at 2669.  
 257. See Rosenfeld, supra note 11, at 362 (“The three main responsibilities of 
a school are best described as prevention, response, and resolution of matters 
involving sexual misconduct.”).  
 258. See supra notes 24–25 and accompanying text; see also Dana Bolger, 
Betsy DeVos’s New Harassment Rules Protect Schools, Not Students, N.Y. TIMES, 
Nov. 28, 2018, at A27 (“We have federal civil rights law like Title IX for a reason. 
Fifty years ago, schools were allowed to impose all sorts of sexist restrictions on 
girls’ ability to learn. . . . We passed Title IX to end that.”).  
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archaic-assumptions, selective enforcement, and erroneous 
outcome are based upon the terminology that essentially serves as 
the justification for federal pressure upon universities. However, 
through the 2011 DCL, the Obama administration sought to 
remove hostility from campus environments, reduce deliberate 
indifference by universities, eradicate archaic assumptions about 
gender dynamics in sexual assault scenarios, prevent selective 
enforcement of university disciplinary policies, and avoid erroneous 
outcomes in their disciplinary proceedings.259  
Generally, courts have been correctly rejecting claims under 
several theories of reverse Title IX claims, including 
hostile-environment,260 deliberate indifference,261 and 
archaic-assumptions.262 These claims should be limited to 
situations in which a plaintiff has experienced harassing conduct 
outside of the Title IX disciplinary proceedings against him.  
The 2011 DCL repeatedly refers to Title IX’s protections in the 
context of addressing situations that create a “hostile 
environment” for students.263 These frequent references to Title 
IX’s attempts at elimination or alleviation of hostile environments 
demonstrate the underlying purpose of the federal guidance to (or 
pressure on) universities—to ensure that all students feel safe in 
their schools and can fully benefit from their educational 
experiences.264 Therefore, it is appropriate for courts to limit the 
 
 259. See generally 2011 DCL, supra note 41 (providing significant guidance 
as to the purposes of the federal instructions). 
 260. See supra notes 124–125 and accompanying text (specifying the 
heightened severity of behavior that must exist to create a hostile environment).  
 261. See supra notes 117–120 and accompanying text (explaining that the 
sexual harassment underlying a deliberate indifference claim must consist of 
more than only sex discrimination in disciplinary proceedings).  
 262. See supra notes 121–123 and accompanying text (limiting the application 
of the archaic-assumptions theory to sex discrimination in athletics).  
 263. See 2011 DCL, supra note 41, at 3 (explaining that a “single or isolated 
incident of sexual harassment may create a hostile environment if the incident is 
sufficiently severe”); id. at 4 (“If a school knows or reasonably should know about 
student-on-student harassment that creates a hostile environment, Title IX 
requires the school to take immediate action to eliminate the harassment, prevent 
its recurrence, and address its effects.”); id. at 5–6 (stating that adopting the 
suggested policies could “bring potentially problematic conduct to the school’s 
attention before it becomes serious enough to create a hostile environment”). 
 264. See id. at 2 (“The Department is deeply concerned about this problem 
and is committed to ensuring that all students feel safe in their school . . . .”).  
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application of the hostile-environment theory to sexual 
harassment significantly above and beyond alleged discrimination 
in disciplinary proceedings. Similarly, most courts have not 
allowed deliberate indifference claims to challenge allegedly unfair 
disciplinary proceedings without a showing of the more classic 
situations of sexual harassment.265 Finally, courts have also 
correctly refused to apply an archaic-assumptions theory to the 
reverse Title IX claims.266 Expansion of these three theories to sex 
discrimination experienced in university disciplinary action is 
inapposite to the actual concepts behind the theories of liability.  
C. Maintaining a High Discriminatory Intent Burden 
Similar to the employment discrimination legal landscape 
that existed when the Court decided McDonnell Douglas, the 
reverse Title IX discrimination jurisprudence demonstrates a 
“notable lack of harmony.”267 As more reverse Title IX claims reach 
the summary judgment stage, it is possible the McDonnell Douglas 
burden shifting framework will play a more significant role in 
plaintiffs’ attempts to support their claims of discriminatory 
intent.268 Theoretically, the frameworks laid out by the court in 
Haley269 can be applied to selective enforcement and erroneous 
outcome claims. However, the application should be strictly 
limited.  
While most selective enforcement theories have yet to succeed 
under reverse Title IX claims, courts have entertained the idea 
that such a claim is viable if the plaintiff student produced more 
 
 265. See Doe v. Miami Univ., 882 F.3d 579, 591–92 (6th Cir. 2018) (explaining 
that deliberate indifference must rise to the level of sexual harassment and that 
one incident of non-consensual kissing was not enough to meet that standard). 
Thus far, Wells v. Xavier University, 7 F. Supp. 3d 746, 751–52 (S.D. Ohio 2014), 
seems to be the only case in which a court explicitly allowed a deliberate 
indifference claim under reverse Title IX to proceed without a clear showing of 
sexual harassment.   
 266. See supra notes 121–123 and accompanying text. 
 267. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 801 (1973). 
 268. See supra notes 174–176 and accompanying text.  
 269. See supra Part IV.B.3. 
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evidence supporting the theory.270 The Moore271 adaptation of the 
McDonnell Douglas framework has many similarities to the 
selective enforcement theory under Title IX. Under the Moore 
burden shifting framework, the plaintiff can establish a 
presumption of bias by demonstrating that the prohibited conduct 
in which he engaged was similar to that engaged in by students 
outside of his protected class (females) and that he received more 
severe disciplinary measures than those others.272 If the plaintiff 
can establish that females at his school were engaged in similar 
conduct to that of which he was accused and disciplined without 
receiving disciplinary action themselves, this would create a 
temporary presumption of discriminatory intent.273  
An erroneous outcome claim is somewhat analogous to the 
Haley court’s other adaptation of McDonnell Douglas burden 
shifting, which fell under the Lovelace framework.274 The Lovelace 
adaptation allows the plaintiff to allege that he was 
discriminatorily separated from his university and shift the initial 
burden “by showing that he was performing at a level that met the 
employer’s legitimate expectations and that the employer sought 
someone else to do the same work.”275 The underlying rationale 
behind the erroneous outcome theory is that the plaintiff is 
“innocent and wrongly found to have committed an offense,”276 
which could be used to demonstrate that the student was 
performing at a level that met his university’s legitimate 
 
 270. See supra notes 114–115 and accompanying text (citing cases in which 
courts have analyzed claims under the selective enforcement theory before 
dismissing due to insufficient allegations).  
 271. See supra notes 240–244 and accompanying text (evaluating the claim in 
Haley under Moore’s framework for discriminatory employee discipline).  
 272. See Moore v. City of Charlotte, 754 F.2d 1100, 1105–06 (4th Cir. 1993)  
(applying the burden-shifting framework).   
 273. But see Saravanan v. Drexel Univ., No. 17-3409, 2017 WL 5659821, at *6 
(E.D. Pa. Nov. 24, 2017) (denying a male plaintiff’s selective enforcement claim 
alleging that he and his female accuser were similarly-situated because she was 
disciplined for sexual harassment while he was accused of sexually harassing and 
stalking her).  
 274. See supra notes 235–239 and accompanying text. 
 275. Haley v. Va. Commonwealth Univ., 948 F. Supp. 573, 580 (E.D. Va. 
1996). 
 276. Yusuf v. Vassar Coll., 35 F.3d 709, 715 (2d Cir. 1994). 
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expectations of him. It is possible courts could apply this theory to 
create a temporary presumption of discriminatory intent.  
However, even if plaintiffs successfully establish a 
presumption of gender bias under the discriminatory intent 
framework, the burden would shift to the university, allowing it 
the opportunity to provide a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason 
for taking disciplinary action against the plaintiff.277 Because the 
plaintiff in an erroneous outcome theory will have been found to 
have committed the underlying offense, this burden will be easy 
for universities to meet.278 If reverse Title IX claims make it to this 
stage of burden shifting, courts should apply a high standard in 
allowing plaintiffs the opportunity to demonstrate that the 
university’s proffered nondiscriminatory reason was a cover-up for 
gender discrimination. If the McDonnell Douglas burden shifting 
framework is further applied to reverse Title IX claims in the 
future, plaintiffs must be required to meet a heightened level of 
specificity. 
VI. Conclusion 
Every year, more and more reverse Title IX claims are being 
brought by accused students against universities. The reverse 
discrimination causes of action under Title IX have become widely 
recognized by federal courts. In many circuits, accused students 
are having some success in using the modern conversation 
surrounding campus sexual assault to create a plausible inference 
of gender bias against them during their disciplinary proceedings. 
In essence, reverse Title IX plaintiffs are using the statute to 
impair the universities’ ability to provide students protections 
under the statute, which is not what Congress intended under Title 
IX.279 The policies and purposes behind Title IX strongly encourage 
restraint by the courts in accepting some types of reverse Title IX 
 
 277. See McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802–03 (explaining that it is not 
necessary for the court to attempt “to detail every matter which fairly could be 
recognized as a reasonable basis for a refusal to hire”).  
 278. See, e.g., Haley, 948 F. Supp. at 580. 
 279. See Yusuf, 35 F.3d at 715 (“We do not believe that Congress meant Title 
IX to impair the independence of universities in disciplining students against 
whom the evidence of an offense, after a fair hearing, is overwhelming, absent a 
claim of selective enforcement.”).  
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claims going forward. Aside from consistency and clarity in judicial 
resolution of these claims, an essential aspect going forward 
centers around schools’ abilities to create and consistently follow 
clear guidance in these procedures. When looking at the big picture 
and “to the larger political landscape, the long-term realization of 
accused and victimized students’ interests depends on the 
perceived legitimacy of disciplinary procedures for gender 
violence.”280  
The conversation surrounding campus sexual assault is as 
pertinent and present as ever, as further evidenced by the 
enormous amount of comments in response to the Trump 
administration’s proposed regulations.281 Among other things, the 
proposed regulations would institute an actual knowledge 
requirement for universities instead of a constructive knowledge 
requirement, which would raise the standard for holding 
universities accountable under deliberate indifference, raise the 
standard of evidence for sexual violence claims, making them more 
difficult to prove, and release universities from liability for 
off-campus incidents between students.282  
It is unclear exactly what impact these regulations would have 
on reverse Title IX claims, especially those blaming federal 
pressure for their universities’ alleged discrimination against 
them. Because of the uncertainty going forward, as well as the 
continuing intensity between competing factions, clarity among 
the courts and consistency within universities are the best ways to 
ensure fair proceedings. Courts need to provide precision in the 
evaluation of reverse Title IX claims and should consider the 
purposes and policies of Title IX in future analyses of such claims. 
 
 280. Brodsky, supra note 6, at 829.  
 281. The Proposed Rule had received 105,842 comments when the comment 
period closed on February 16, 2019. See generally Nondiscrimination on the Basis 
of Sex in Education Programs or Activities Receiving Federal Financial 
Assistance, 83 Fed. Reg. 61,462 (proposed Nov. 29, 2018) (to be codified at 34 
C.F.R. pt. 106).  
 282. Id. 
